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was the policy of the eslsaisl. p o m r to dislodge powor from
the ruling slit© who m r o tmeooperativo and plae© it i.® the
hands of thou# aatle# iadivldtiftl* who weald obey orders fro®
the colonial odMisiotratloa*

the .British An India adhered

to this policy e1
la the p r & m m of nation formtlea sines ladopea»
i

4m m » a small native odoeoted alasa has emerged to jxravido
the ©i^aaimtieiiel leadership for the new political entity*
This class t edaaated la Western way*» b m m m cpite aof&iatl*
eaied in the tastiaa and tastei^ttaa #Jf .political. pemr«

A©

the colonial administrator# departed* their aativa aufcordic.
Mt#« were preaeted hr the new wffwtmttfo fro® tha lower
MMgwrial and ©lories! post® to fill vacancies*

la their

new position of power they fetgan to m m m i m m m m l over
the oeaatry* Heir# to the iantrnmMto and pemetleee of
powert they m m

m m their own waster® end wars not subject

to order* t w m the higher echelon of
Hag©#*

&**&«« or the

Also# they had the support of the native m s s s m «

Mato which had oodo life eapleeeeM for tho deported oolo*
alol power®«

Furthermore*, they

m m afel© to utilloo the

powerful force of Mt io oo li M to rally support for proJoetod
goal*«

the national ©lit* groups in the developing m l ion©
« _,.

Collar*, iwamwit

Torhi

MusRillsa and C m p e a y l •*$?'« pp»

A M&jLsgAJSMiC »*w

4

m i 1st fairly aaally described*:

Typically ihay aoaatltata

its® than oiie*»te&th of on® par teat of lb# pegoilatlea*

they

h & m raaaivad * w«tir« •dttMtto# at itaab tftrwtgh high
aahool* as! Utny tun# to *oi»aftti*ta in tfea larger eibios#.
they far&lah bit# Xaadardtiji far daattrtt type ®Fg»nlm%lm»t
labor xadAm^ peMiieni parti##*

and prefaasioaal

flitir ability t# apeak a tfaatm laafaagp la
additdoa he- their a«&iy* teagna araataa aa offaetlva tbtnaal
through wbieli ifeatarm taawladga tan fee J&tradaaad into b m U *
w a rd

a re s ® *

IteftortwiiataXyt tfca political ayatea la which the
elite pradaotaatad wee net a prodtet o f their #«» political

eanrlrotmettt#

Hipy of the adapted fcaa&ani p o litic a l -stwe*

tar®® were therefore la conflict with tie daap* underlyingq
.rtlisiatttj) e t & m a l ^ and feiaborieitl m % m m of the m m

fiartlMtfWMr«« the tvaftaj&aaaad taatitmbloiis were oat oaptMe
o f sroftttlRK rad ical efeaagaa*

*fb a hhatory o f the emerging,

aatioas e la a rly la d ia a t** bt»% the goreroatatai iattitmtioae
of a d a la la tra tia a aai otmhrel which bad % m n davtlapad by

the colonial e«t»in!«tyabieiwi © w r the year#
liahtd and re atataa t to abaaga**^

w e re

w ell #«tab«*

la a titn tia a a adapted by

1«Mm »* U m m * M M I t e l i l 1
Catmtrlea flew forks J« wfl^fiSo Sand*» lat*.*
^ileary frank 0
e
e
d
w
»
.pJg|f .i.Iyil ieipEief

{lew 8avaai

Tala fclyaraity fraaay i W b

p* ft*

faMatjat

the dovoloping society thus thwarting progra®© that wr ©
dosigaod to alter tbm status too«

in the p®&t~&M@pmdmeQ

period* ® & r m m r t there m m little immediate 1m m % t m to
change*

Primeny roqttloitoo w t the imiftfconttftoo of ardor.

.MMl OftllOOtiOfl Of tOJCSO*
In the typical a w *otio&» tiioroforo* political
pcwor came to root in %hm h&M© of an odttootod nativo clooo
wfcioti aonopollgod tbo rospooolblo positions in the govern**

ttORt«
la.abort* the no* a»tioii^p«ri»»# a dotiulo or nor®
after ooMoolof ind«p*pd®®et*»*4ss toeing run by the higher
vMkftng civil mod atilitary officerse those offSoars
m m So #» oaoootftaily strong powor poslties* tot*,
bsrring. boon odoootodttwboMovor i«porfo«ti.y*»*la the liberal
traditions of tho $•**» they hovo a ooooo of guilt, la
& aoaoo* history .bos oomo a full circle in on© genera*
tioa tilth oao no Jar different©*' tho ruling bureaucracy
is native rotbor'tboft foroigtt* tho n m nuing group '■
nay bo u&gorstondably uneasy when it considers tho fato
of its prodooomoroft'

1m order to inoroooo the prottlgo of the regime
both within the country and abroad the bureaucratic
lMd«rsblp nay pronttigftta » nan constitution* this
bonds to insure a oontiimation of aid from ths tiootorn
nations, iitbongb p m to of the constitution nr# r©~
plot© tilth familiar democratic terminology* it is m m % ly
clear to the trained abssrvtr that it is not a 4« m »
orabit ecmstitttticn* tfe© Xcglslatlv# body is sot up
in such « way that it csa bo readily Oooisotod by tht
@ m m tiro branch of tbo govorwont* • « « 0ano»ilf on©

finds that the legisMtnro lacks the pooor to roimoo
the oioo of tour©uueraeies**~whether civil or military**
merely by cutting the budget, * . »
Once ©at*bllsh«d0 the military resist any- chang©
which might m m % to weak#®, or render loss secure its
<m& position of domination |, on the other hand it presses
for projooto likely to enhance its ability to control
ths nfttion© thus it supports immtmmit, to t m p m m the
transportatioa ani coa^unication aystes# to raise
health otantfordo* to upgrade the torching of .scientific
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S«vele$dug ® w m t r i m M

b. aede

this m i b#r suspicious of any

regime that declares it# goal te be the est«bllsiM*0t of
deweersey*

Tfe® oligarchy which g m m m Pefcteteii h m declared

deassswty be be it# goal* Whether this Is t .geimisi# a®plra«
ttsx remains to be seen*

tbie paper will explore the role

end setloas of the power soatftn&srs in ftskistsu is m

effort

to tfetersltte the trae nature of their eewMitaant to the
ideals of d m m r m f *

eehieve thle ebi«etlire» the author

jpreyeeee to m m i m the eeossnle philosophy* power tosses*
end political «etlvetie«ke of the#© group# which control the

power streetere of Bekiatea*

Essentially the question la;

6*» as etttfaeyiteriee oriented pelitim l structure ssd **
tutds&deretle » hierarch#lly organised society, 4onis#tei toy
selfish elasses, achieve m m a aedieww of denetreeyt
Bsfeistss wee eleeeifiei by S M I # in 1959 ## a frolic
tieel system whieh ie controlled by a **s4*v&iflsg ellgtr*
efcgr*”

4 »©d#rMslfsf oligarchy Is described by Shlls as a

political eyetee
* • * eeafcrelled: fey toureewsretis and/or military effl*
©or eli^eee is whleh SeMoerstie eosstitutiou* hare feeea
suspended or In which they do not exist* The goal® of
the slit# m f or *ey not include democratIsatAone Hi©
andereieing impulse usually take# the form of a eoseerxt
for efficiency #*s$ rationality« Staterslsefcles ellgsr*
Chios are usually strongly eetiwtedl toward economic
development. T M ■
structure ef wedersising
oligarchic® eoaeestrstes power is the haude of a clique
of adlitsry officers or feureauersts whs are usually
placed in control of the chief Mtslstries* Turkey
under Atsturfc and contemporary Pakistan and the Sudsn

#

ar®

of nwtaraisisg oligarch!«•**
this paper will sadssvar to test the validity of

iM a c la s s ific a tio n a* i t applies to Pafcistsii in

1965«

It has taken centuries for a democratic and ladm®o
trlslissd society to waive la many smwtrtsft of the Most®
the underdeveloped countries of tho Ssstsm hsa&sptisrs hop©
to sefeisvs these foolo in a single gonoration.* ©on thin
b®

oooo»s»llshftd if'following democratic goals!

ilier® tlit

m o o of tb® population lives at ottboiotoitoo level or slightly
above p is it rsssouftbl* to oxpoet reprmm%m%im
lion itoiuuBnod Ayub Ifean. led a military eonp
of tie parliamentary gororammt in Pskist&n# it stated tint
hia ultimate «lm n m to introduce a. constitution m i rootoro
constitutional life „2

ftroi^lsoat this study# the ‘
troth of

M s Intent 1# to bo oxoaisod«

The method h m b a m to review

tli# power structure of the military government * which In
this instance m m s Miliary oligarchy with aodsraisiag m**
plratiofts*

Tbs underlying theory# w M c b so categorised tho

military g o w r w e a t of Pakistani# .isae dotorninod the line of
aaalyals.fr

Thus* the Initial eoeditiOBO which prevailed whoa

■martial law urns sstabilslMd will, be the has® from wMet* its®
efforts to modernise will be *jnml&td«
t&twsrd Shil»# cited la Alatoad and Coleman» ®&<, &!%»«.

P« 51*
%#hj»i®d. Ayub Elan# friends Wot Master*! ( M m forks
Oxford ttaiveralty i¥sss» t w ) , p» 77*

9

W h m MMurtiaX law was established p authority was
sentrailaad and strictly controlled» with the at® that
atablltty fe# established*. Ibis was the power base
which could instigate polities! change*

Th# iapetws was

gapeadttit tipoa tha t®pla®e»tabiaii of lyub I ban8® intentions*
this study is tonsemsd with the removal of martial
law aiti the ietobXlefcuMmt of elected and selected imtblbu**
tiooo«

The trtneltleit which hat taken plate ao»t h© ana**

lyietf to determine the extent that theee institutions art
foaotiottios*

there a transfer of powor m 4 if a## to

what extent may it b# utilised?

Is Integral unite of »#**

tioisol growth# the concern % h m m m m to the rolo of the
institutions in the erolutloft toward® a full 4m m m ® f 0 If
th« military oligarchs' 1® truly modernising» thoro will fee
evidence of those institutions porfondng a political fane**
tioa m & are not partly facades to placate the &oj}«rwll&g
eliteac
likewise,# If the soaMHttiM toward

is

being saintaiBod# there should be evidence that the military
oligarchy la receptive to the dananda of the uea-raXiug
elites and the interest groups« The network of eeMutlea*
ties® should permit a free flow of weoeages to and firm the
ruling elite*

If tha restriction and censure of apposition

articulation is stifled# then the deaocratic process ha©
been halted*

this study will seek for signs of compromise

w
batwaea % M opposition groups mti tho ruling alii®*
tfee period of ttwly 1* fplttftrtly aaoaarttad with the
m r m * * f m r &p m in the tmmty y m m that Paklataa has existed,
es « polities!.! entity*

In 19$$* tha eoup d*atat ©f Ayufc

ihatt aigaalad the abrogation of #©aishltmti©;«3. govanMiant*
Saaaxk year# later national aiaetiosa war® hold*
aaaa^a providad & dasareatioa ©I* time in which m

fhaaa tita
study tha

political proa#*#*
Hawairar* it k m proved expedient An so»a aeotiona ©f
this 8%u4y to axtand beyond 196$*

Is aaeb olraaasfcanaa#

tha rtparouaaiotia of legislation css ha Filmed and an aaaaaa*
twut Aoda of tha daaoaoatiaiai process„
Notarial for this papar ws® gathered froa ft aariatp
of aaaraaa«

It included parlodlaalay tooka* infanaatlait

pattphlata and paraonal ltttar?i«wa«

Hawavar* aanaorahip of

the press in Pakistan sad# it aaoaaaary to faly an material
printed elsewhere for a critical, analyaia of donaatie poll*
elaa* and the avaluaklan of dawaaratia davalejmant*

Thra*

ntwapapara war# inapaetad: tha .London .Tlqaa* tha M m .lurk
flues« sad the fakjfttan (lahore) tlnaa* $geapt for tha
latterj there wara ralativaly faw articles dealing, with the
them# of this paper*

the Pakistan times came under censor-

ship and therefor# was dlaao&t&uaad as a soar©#*

lot all research sources from Pakistan w®r# disre**gardad* hut this writer m d a an effort to avaluata tha

tf
material in torus of it being vehiele* of gm m m m m t prop**
saa&e«

The theoretic*! framework was provided by ftheorle*

presented by United..State* antliors® and m u i m m m in. t)ui
dmAopeuMt of the paper was giveo by Political
gfarb»t«t a*«ber*»

$o~

CHAPTER IX

THE POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF PAKISTAN
The most powerful outside influence on India for
three centuries preceding partition in 1947 was that of
Great Britain, whose traders, accountants, civil servants,
and soldiers gradually introduced western concepts of law,
education, democracy, and administration,,

The higher caste

Hindus were the first to comprehend these new ideas and used
every opportunity to obtain a modern education in the newly
established colleges.

As a result, they gradually became

dominant in the British-led public services, the professions,
and commerce.

On the other hand, Muslims, who ruled a sub

stantial portion of the Indian subcontinent at the time the
British last India Company was gaining a foothold there,
showed their contempt for the newcomers by turning their
backs on the language and the culture of the lest.

In time

the Muslim leaders revised their attitude toward the learn
ing of the West, but increasingly they resented the greater
influence of the Hindus.1 The Muslims feared that as a
minority group in an independent and democratic India, they
1Khan, Friends Not Masters. on. cit.. p. 159.
12

13
would be relegated forever to a secondary position#

Under

All Jinnah*s effective leadership, they pressed for and were
ultimately successful in obtaining a separate and sovereign
nation in which the majority of the citizens were Muslims*-*
In 1947 Great Britain surrendered its sovereignty
over India*

Simultaneously, India was partitioned and most

of the Muslim majority areas became the independent nation
of Pakistan*
In both East and West Pakistan the population is
predominantly poor and illiterate*

A typical family income

is about 1250 rupees (approximately $250 U.S. dollars) per
year and is derived from agriculture*

More than BO per cent

of the people in Pakistan live in one of the country*s
100,000 villages*

One of the more important elements in

the life of a Pakistani family, apart from the struggle to
exist, is religion,

Islam affects the diet, marriage eus~

toms, primary education, and polities#^
The enormous and complicated task of dividing the
personnel, the assets, and the liabilities of India was
assigned to a Partition Council created about two months
before partition.

The Council, assisted by steering com*

aittees, dealt with every aspect of administration,
1Donald M, Wilbur, Pakistan (Hew Haven;
1964), p» 11B*
2Alfred Guillaume, Islam (Baltimore;
Ltd*, 1962), p. 101*

Hraf Press,

Penguin Book

14
orgsiiisatio®# personnel, record*,

foreign relations*,

armed services# and trade and currencyJ

The Muslim civil

servants in India and the non-Muslim civil servants in
Pakistan were allowed to decide their future nationality
for themselves*

Approximately 25 POCXS government employees

and-their families# with 60#000 tons of personnel baggage #
had to he transported from Delhi to Karachi.#

A special train

service for them was suspended because of derailment and the
looting and murdering of passengers which was taking place
at the borders * treaty airplanes of the British Overseas
Air Corporation were chartered and many thousands of
government personnel were evacuated fro© Delhi fey air during
the first two weeks of September# 194?*2

In this exchange

of persons# Pakistan obtained a surplus of cultivators and
artisans# but lost most ©f its merchants# clerks# account*
ants# and profeaalonalSo
It has bee® estimated that 6,000#000 Muslim refugees
came to Pakistan# and 5#500,000 Hindus and Sikhs left Pakis
tan*

Most of the people traveled m foot# the largest ©on*

voy ©f persona numbering 400*000*

Accurate figures are not

available# but it ham been estimated, that 17,000,000 per
sons crossed the borders fro» one territory to another

(Princeton:

» pp« 397-96<>

%hroftQloirr of Pakistan 1947-57 (Karachi i Kami
Publications# 'August, 1$WT, pp« 14*fo.

15
between 1947 and 1950.1 During these population movements
riots* massacres, looting, and arson broke out on a scale
that was completely unimagined or foreseen-

About a million

persons died, 500,000 of whom were Muslims,

Property loss

and damage were beyond account.

For those successful in

their trek there were further hardships to come,

Refugee

camps were unable to meet the demands for food and lodgings.
Also, the receipts given by the governments, both Indian and
Pakistani, for belongings and assets left behind by the refu
gees were usually delayed.

In these distressing conditions,

many of the refugees were forced to eke out an existence
in whatever manner they could.

The events and incidents

which occurred during this period of mass migration further
magnified the enmity that existed between the Muslims and
Hindus,^
The establishment of a capitol for a nation of
eighty million people in a few months* time would have been
a remarkable feat under the most ideal circumstances.
Karachi the circumstances were far fro® ideal.

In

Prior to

1947 Karachi had been a relatively quiet, clean port and
commercial center with fewer than a million citizens, the
majority of whom were Hindus, and other non-Muslim groups.
10. H. K, Spate, India and Pakistan (Londons
and Company, 1963), p. 118.

Methuen

^Richard Syraonds, The Making of Pakistan (London:
Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1950), p. $4.

16
By 1951 the census indicated that the population had more
than doubled and that it was now 96 per cent Muslim, most of
them refugees from India.

The results were massive conges

tion, a breakdown of the sanitary facilities, and the estab
lishment of makeshift refugee slums.

All commercial and

banking operations were at a virtual standstill.
In this chaotic setting all of the essential mechani
cal paraphernalia of government had to be found and put in
its proper place; phones, files, typewriters, and office
furniture.
Partition and Nationhood
In spite of the confusion associated with the crea
tion of Pakistan, the structure of government changed little
at partition.

A parliamentary form of government was estab

lished, headed by the Governor-General from Pakistan.

It is

true that rudimentary forms of parliamentary government had
existed on the Indian subcontinent since the British govern
ment Introduced the Constitutional Reforms of 1919.

The

reforms were enlarged and extended under the Act of 1935* but
they did not provide a genuine or full-fledged form of par
liamentary government.

let, the British themselves appar

ently did not think that a parliamentary government, fashioned
after the British system would be successful if established
in the subcontinent.

In its debate on the Indian Act of 1935,

1?
a committee of the British parliament was distinctly pessi
mistic about the future of parliamentarianism in India,
arguing that "with the best translation, the essential
meaning was lost*"1 The committee agreed that the essential
components which had contributed to the success of the
parliamentary system in Britain; such as the principle of
majority rule, the willingness of the minority to accept
for the time the judgment of the majority and the existence
of great political parties divided on political policies
rather than by regionalism, were absent on the

subcontinent.^

Despite the presence of these obstacles, the new
federal government was adopted during the summer of 1947*
The provinces of Sind, Punjab, Worth-West Frontier, Baluchis
tan * and Bengal were each granted a provincial legislature.
Initially, it was the aim of the British to transfer or
delegate more power from the central government to its
provinces,

However, during World War II the governments

had broken down in the majority of the provinces, and as a
result such a plan had to be withdrawn.

Provincial leaders

had hoped that this situation would be altered after inde
pendence, but, in fact, a higher degree of centralisation
evolved.

For example, if the constitutional machinery in a

1G, W. Choudhury, "Democracy on Trial in Pakistan,"
Middle Bast Journal, XVII {Winter-Spring, 1963), 2,
%ilcox, op. cit., p. 76,

1$
province broke down, the Governor-General through emergency
powers was granted the authority to take over the administra
tion of the province,

’’The government of India Act divided

legislative powers into three lists, , . . in the event of
conflict, the federal law was to prevail.”^
The federal body, the Constituent Assembly, was
established before partition.

Members were elected by

communal groups in the provincial assemblies, voting by
proportional representation.

The qualification for voting

privileges varied from province to province but generally
they were based upon education and property.

As a result

only about 15 per cent of the total population was entitled
to vote,

Each member was to represent one million inhabi

tants, giving the Pakistan Assembly BO members.

Eventually,

when partition came, the successful candidates formed the
Constituent Assembly.2
The First Constituent Assembly met on August 10,
1947 and elected Ali dinnah as its President,

On August 15,

Jinnah was sworn in as the first Governor-General of Pakis
tan; shortly thereafter Liaquat All Khan became Prime Minis
ter,

On August 19, government offices commenced their

operations.
The role of the Governor-General was intended to be
1Keith Callard, op. cit., p. 163,
2Ibid.. p. G2.
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that of a figurehead, similar to that of M s counterpart in
Canada and Australia*

His appointment was made on the ad*

vice of the cabinet*.

If the Governor-General proved to be

unacceptable to the cabinet, his services could be termi
nated and a successor nominated by the cabinet*

Although

the Pakistan Provisional Constitutional Order 1947 assigned
certain reserve powers to the Governor-General, the limits
of his power were not clearly defined*

wlt could be used

to control a ministry, or a legislature which was violating
the constitution, indulging in acts of wanton irresponsibility
or flagrantly damaging the larger public interest♦"'f
Under the provisions of the Provincial Order 1947,
the Prime Minister was undoubtedly expected to be the center
of power*

However, Mr. Jinnah, the unquestioned and power

ful leader of the independence movement chose to continue as
Governor-General,

"As a consequence of this decision the

normal convention of cabinet government had no chance to
develop.Power followed Mr. Jinnah.
The members of his council of ministers felt themselves
to be his lieutenants* They were prepared to execute
his orders or to be overruled by him on any point,
either individually or as a group* The possibility of
instructions proceeding from the cabinet to the GovernorGeneral did not arise; it was, in fact, unthinkable*
From the beginning, it was assumed that the normal con
ventions of the office of Governor-General could never
apply to Mr* Jinnah,3
11bid.. p. 130*
3Ibid.* p. 132.

2Ibid*, p. 131*
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The death of Mr* Jinnah in September 194$ made
possible the beginning of cabinet government.

Liaquat All

Khan, the chief lieutenant of Mr. Jinnah, and the leading
statesman in the country did not enjoy the same dominant
position among his colleagues as had the founder of Pakis
tan.

Mr. Khan chose to remain as Prime Minister, and

Khwajia Nazimuddin was selected as Governor-General.

Unlike

Jinnah he confined himself to the constitutional role of
Governor-General.

In 1951 All Khan was assassinated, and

the problem of

succession arose since there was no heir

apparent*

crisis was eventually resolved

The

when Mr.

Nazimuddin vacated his position as Governor-General to be
come Prime Minister.
his post.

Ghulam Mohammad was appointed to fill

At first, Mr. Mohammad did not attempt to exceed

his proper function,

However, the continual Increase in

political and economic problems caused the Governor-General
to announce:
I have been driven to the conclusion that the cabinet
of Khwajia Nazimuddin has proved entirely inadequateto
grapple with the difficulties facing the country. In
the emergency which has arisen I have felt it incumbent
upon me to ask the cabinet to relinquish office so that
a new cabinet better fitted to discharge its obligation
toward Pakistan may be formed.1
The difficulties which the Governor-General spoke
of centered around the cabinet’s inability to provide a
constitution,

resolve the food crisis which was increasing,

tIbid., p. 135.
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and the serious decline In Pakistani exports which came about
as a result of the ending of the Korean War.

Also, civil

disorders had broken out in the Punjab and the government
had allowed it to get out of control before they had sent
in troops.

A new cabinet was formed under the leadership of

Mohammad All,

Me, too, was unable to solve the problems

which were besetting Pakistan,

Twenty-seven months later

the Governor-General exercised his power to declare a state
of emergency and to dissolve the Ali cabinet.

The next

cabinet included General Ayub Khan, a soldier and General
Mirza, a civil servant with a military background.
One of the most vexing problems facing the political
leaders of Pakistan was that of arriving at a consensus
about the nature and form of the government.

Constitution-

making proved to be a far more difficult task than anyone
anticipated.

For more than seven years after 1947 the

Constituent Assembly attempted, without success, to adopt
a constitution.

There were many reasons for this failure.

Jinnah had died in 194#, and without his leadership the
dominant party, the Muslim League became fraught with dis
sension.1 The desired goal of an Islamic state proved
impossible to define in constitutional terms.

Then, too,

political rivalries arose between the eastern and western
territories of Pakistan over a formula for determining their

York:

1Lawrence K. Rosinger led.), The State of Asia (lew
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951)* p. 494.
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respective representations in the central assembly.

The

problems of representation of minority religious groups and
the selection of a national language also proved to be ex
tremely troublesome.

The inability of the Assembly to

resolve these issues led Governor-General Mohammad to dis
miss not only the cabinet in 1954* but also the Constituent
Assembly.
The second Constituent Assembly was elected in dune
1955*

More success attended its efforts* for within a year

it was able to draft a constitution that was acceptable to
a majority of the Assembly members.

It was, however?

. . . a document of despair. The Prime Minister
(Chaudhri Mahammad Ali) was so anxious to go down in
history as the author of the Constitution that he was
prepared to accommodate all points of view. What the
country got was not a Constitution but a hotch-potch
of alien concepts which had already brought enough con
fusion and chaos to the country. The Constitution* by
distributing power between the President* the Prime
Minister and his cabinet* and the provinces, destroyed
the focal point of power and left no one in a position
of control.1
The promulgation of the constitution in 1956 did
not eliminate the political intrigues and corruption which
the Assembly members practiced.

Votes in the Assembly were

bought and sold with such frequency that it was difficult to
Identify individuals with any party*

If an Assembly member

was bribed he would completely ignore the opinion of his
party and vote as he had been bribed to do.

Nepotism was

1Ayub Khan, Friends hot Masters, op. cit.s p. 50.
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widely practiced as was the bribing of electors during
political campaigns.
for private aims.

Civic responsibilities were discarded

Eventually the political situation deter

iorated to such a point that Assembly members were using
physical rather than verbal exertions to express their
opinions.

The Speaker of the Legislative Assembly in last

Pakistan, for example, was manhandled and chased from the
House.

A few days later the Deputy Speaker was beaten to

death during another Assembly incident.**
The political process deteriorated to such an extent
that on October 7, 195$, President Miraa issued a procla
mation abrogating the constitution and 1956 Martial Law was
declared.

All cabinets and representative assemblies, both

provincial and national were dissolved as were all political
parties.

The president appointed General Mohammad Ayub Khan,

commander-in-chief of the army, as martial law administrator
and supreme commander of the armed forces.

He justified his

actions in the following terms:
For the last two years I have been watching with
deepest anxiety the ruthless struggle for power, corrup
tion, the shameful exploitation of our simple, honest,
patriotic and industrious masses, the lack of decorum
and the prostitution of Islam for political ends. , . .
The despicable activities have led to a dictatorship of
the lowest order* Adventurers and exploiters have
flourished to the detriment of the masses and are get
ting richer by their nefarious practices.
1Shalid All Eizvi, "Local Bodies in Pakistan,"
Pakistan .Quarterly (Winter, 1966), p. 56.
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The mentality of the political parties has sunk so
low that I am un&hl© any longer to believe that elec
tions will improve the present chaotic internal situa
tion and enable us to form a strong and stable govern
ment capable of dealing with innumerable and complex
problems facing us today.1
There was no violence.

On the following day General

Mohammad Khan* in a radio address , told the nation that he
had accepted the assignment with great reluctance in the
belief that the only other alternative was chaos and col
lapse.

The army, he said, had always kept vseverely aloof

from politics* . . . Our ultimate aim is to restore democ
racy but of the type that our people can understand and
work.*2
On October 24 President Mirza named General Mohammad
Ayub Khan as Prime Minister to form a new twelve-man cabinet.
Three days later Mirssa himself was removed from office and
forced to hand over all powers to the General, who then
assumed the title of president.

The new executive announced

that martial law would continue in order to give "legal
cover for certain reforms we want to put through."3

He

indicated that he intended to press for increased food
production, land reforms, and a simplified legal system.
The post of Prime Minister was abolished. The commanders1New Tork Times.October $, 195®, p» 1.
% e w York Times. October 9, 195&, p. 5*
3Hew York Times.October31> 195&0 p. 1.

la-chief of the three military services (army, navy, air
force) were designated Deputy Chief Martial Law Administra
tors*

Other senior military officers were appointed to head

up martial law administration in each of the three toness
Kanaehi, last Pakistan, and West Pakistan*
Clearly, military rule had begun*

The new president

found it expedient, however, to make as few changes in
government administration as possible*

He announced that

the abrogates would be followed in the absence of directives
to the contrary*

The regular courts were to continue to

function, but no court writs against martial law administra
tors or their orders would be allowed*

This restriction, of

course, nullified a good deal of the courts* power*
The new presidents cabinet contained three generals,
three civil servants, and five lawyers.

All were college

graduates who had traveled, widely and many had graduate
degrees| a majority had studied in England*

With one or two

possible exceptions, they were well qualified by training
and experience for the administrative responsibilities
assigned to them.

All had achieved a degree of prominence

in India prior to partition.
tan.

Only four were from East Pakis

Two (both of them lawyers from last Pakistan) were

experienced in politics.

Hot one could be described as a

businessman or industrialistj only one had served with the
Civil Service of Pakistan as a prominent minister, and none

was a major landlord*1
Land reforms, the elimination of income tax evasion
and black marketing, and the elimination of corruption among
governmental officials received top priority under the new
regime*

Within months of taking office the president an

nounced that no person would be allowed to own more than 500
acres of irrigated or 1,000 acres of unirrigated land In
West Pakistan, and promised that the large landlords, some
6.000 of them, would be compensated for their

losses* ^

After

the president threatened to prosecute all who failed to
report their Income in accordance with the income tax laws,
previously unreported income in excess of a billion rupees
was

disclosed*3

Several politicians and businessmen were

prosecuted for black marketing; the most noteworthy case
Involved Mr* M« A. Ihuhro, a former Minister of Defense,
who was sentenced to five years imprisonment and fined
150.000 rupees on a charge of illegally selling a new auto
mobile*^
Commissions were set up to study and recommend
reforms in the fields of education and law*

Educational

1Khalid B« Sayeed, nMartial Law Administration in
Pakistan,” Far Eastern Survey, XOTI1 (1959), 73-74*
^Pakistan Hews Digest« February 1, 1959.
3Ibid* * July 1, 1959*
4Goodnow, op. cit.* pp. 254-55*
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standards, in the president’s view, needed to be raised
and oriented more toward the country’s need for technicians,
professional personnel, and administrators.

Recommendations

along such lines were published and reforms were urged to
provide educational opportunity on the basis of ability and
aptitude rather than the financial standing of the parents.
The press was subjected to censorship. Martial law
regulations prohibited the organization, convening, or
attending of any political meeting or gathering.

The presi

dent reiterated many times, however, that all of his actions
were taken for the sole purpose of molding the kind of social
environment in which democracy could function successfully;
the country needed to be rescued from the chaos into which
it had been plunged by unscrupulous politicians,

MThere has

been no limit to the depth of their baseness* chicanery,
deceit, and degradation,1***
The president’s stated aim was to use the armed
forces for civil purposes as seldom as possible.

He asked

the civilian agencies to discharge their duties honestly,
justly, and faithfully.

This was their opportunity to show

their full worth, since for once there would be no politi
cians about to interfere,
Ayub Khan made it clear that he would tolerate no
1Statement broadcast by Radio Pakistan, October S,
195$, Pakistan Embassy of Pakistan, Washington D.C., H.O.
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opposition, that he had assumed complete lawmaking control,
and that he would not hesitate to curtail civil liberties
whenever his program seemed to demand it.

At the same time

he indicated that he did not wish to go beyond the dictates
of necessity and that he ultimately wanted to return to
constitutional government,^

1Ayub Khan, Friends, fgt Masters., o&.

p. 01.
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Before partition, the Governor-General was the uadis*
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head of Indian administration sad as Viceroy he repre*

xseated the British Grew

in India*
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provided that the president should seek the advise of the
cabinet in choosing a prime minister# he was not hound to
do so or to heed the advice*
When there was one political party or a cohesive
coalition of parties with a clear majority in the National
Assembly t

the president appointed its leader as prime

minister and responded to the advice of the cabinet.*

Af*

ter 1954 there was- no stable political party of coalition
and the real power rested with the president# who could
always remove an uncooperative prime minister* 1 The «*ar»
else of strong political leadership by the president .in
Pakistan had its precedence in the rule of the British
Oovernors-General and by Ifofcanaad All Jiimah, Pakistanis
first Governor»Gcneral*2
However# the chief executive is dependent on the
cooperation of the civil and military services*

Since 1951#

the offices of Governor*»Genera1 and president have been
filled either by an ©x~civil servant or by a military ®m*$
traditionally he does not sit idly about while politicians
Interfere in the administrative structures and the policies
of the government*

Furthermore# there Is no precedent in

*For example# Suhrawardy's removal in 1957*
Mallard# £g:
* cit*» p* 20*
iGoodnow j o p * cit** p* 75*

3!

the history of Pakistan for a chief's executive power being
made accountable to elected representatives or even to public
opinion*
frm the downfall of t&rca in 195fi to 1960* there
was no constitutional president*

During this period# power

was concentrated in the hands of Khan.# Chief Martial law
Administrator 0 Seeking to achieve a measure of popular
support for his regime # he cast about for a device by which
scat measure of democracy could be safely introduced without
destroying his own power or endangering his position*

Be

finally came up with the system known as Basic Democracy*
✓

.Basie -Democracies and the 1962 Constitution
In Shan*® opinion there were four prerequisites
which were essential to the successful functioning of democ
racy in a developing country#

the form of democracy should

be simple to understand*, easy to work * and cheap to sustain*
It should put to the voter only such questions as he could
answer In the light of his personal knowledge*.

It should

ensure the effective .participation of ©11 eit1sens, and it
should be able to produce reasonably strong, and stable gov
ernment ^
His Basle Democracy system, he thought* would permit
1Mohammad Ayub Khan* ^Pakistan Perspective,’1 Foreign
Affairs (Duly# 1960)* p« 547*
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the illiterate villagers to meet with and judge the integ
rity of the candidates lor office a*1 Hopefully# this would
eliminate mass voting for candidates with indefinite .poli
cies and eliminate such of the intimidation that had heon
prevalent*

Under his system# representatives of small

village® could meet directly with administrative officials
on four levels of government,2

People and government would

cooperate in shaping domestic policies and in planning for
improvement In socio-economic conditions^
the four levels# or tiers as they were called# on
an ascending scale m m

the village Union Councils t the

fefisii {Mast Pakistan) and Than® {Hast Pakistan) Councils#
the District Councils, and the Divisional Councils*

111

of these councils were to cooperate with a Provisional
Development Advisory Council which would advise the pro
vincial governments 0 In addition to certain assigned func
tions# each level had supervisory and coordinating powers
over the lower tiers#3
the Union Councils had# in addition to such respon
sibilities as were assigned to it by the government and the
District Councils# authority to try petty crimes# institute
lOoodnow# eg, eft* * p» 260*
2Ay»b Khan, MftHflff. & £ l82SflES» £22" £ & ' » P= 2°8.

3Basic jMwaraalM (Bureau of Satlonal Reconstruetion# Government of Pakistan# n«d»), pp* 13*17*

n
public works8 run health and literacy centers* plan sanitary
measures and form agricultural cooperatives,'*
Second tier Tehsil/fhana Councils had mainly coordi
nating .functions*

The District Council1a jurisdiction «*»

tended to elementary schools* medical facilities* recreation
and community development s and traffic regulation*
could tax and allocate funds.

They

In Khan^ plan they were the

has# from which his government policies could he implemented*2
The highest level* the Divisional Councils* had
similar powers over a much larger area and also served as a
grievance committee for complaints against the government-J
The implementation of the three upper tiers was conti&gent upon the election and establishment of the Onion
Councils * the unit most basic to the entire system*■
The membership of each of the three levels above the
Onion Councils was made up of the chairman of the tier
immediately below it and m equal number of m m appointed
fey the government*
Union Councils at the outset consisted of two-thirds
elected members and one-third appointed- members* usually
1Mohammad Iqufeai Choudhry and &ushtaq Ahmed Khan*

M M m l . &9SMM, (Peshawar!

Moorsoms* 19641* P« W *

2Masihua-2aman» "How Pakistan is Governedsn Pakistan
.Quarterly* XIII (Autumn-Winter* 1964)* 123*
3Ibid,
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government officials*

la the formation of the Union Council

it was a general aim that there should ha a representative
of minority groups such as agricultural laborers and women,
and that at least one or two of the members were literate
In preparation for elections within the Sasic Democ
racies scheme, President Khan, in December 1959# lifted the
ban on political meetings and undertook a tour of Pakistan
to acquaint the people with his m m plan,

the ©lections

held on December 2d, 1959, were for the purpose of choosing
the Basic Democrats, that is, those for the Union Councils*
To qualify for ©lection a candidate had to be twenty-five
years of age, on the electoral role of his constituency, and
be solvent,

He could not qualify if he had a prison record

of more than si*, months* or if he wm a government employee,^
The UO,000 constituencies (40,000 in each of the provinces}
each .had a voting population of 1,000 to 1,500, end each
constituency would elect on© Basic Democrat,

Once elected,

the Basic Democrat, together with those of neighboring dis
tricts would take his place on the Union Council of his
area*
The results of the ©lections were not announced
until the middle of February, 1960*
1M mM M m m m S m * m «

m $&°*

A breakdown of the votes
p° 24*

2Choudhry and Khan, ££* ©ft*» pp* 105-06*

east showed that a greater percentage of rural voters exer
cised their franchise than did urban dwellers#1 the turnouts
of women voters was greater than expected*
of the eligible women voted m

About 4 per cent

compared with 6? per cent of

the meit*3
In M s analysis of the first election to the Union
Councils, Sayeed suggests that "Basic Democracies seem to
have attracted more attention among less sophisticated voters
than those la urban areas where the demand for the restore**
tion of parliamentary democracy has been persistent**^

This

seems natural since the Union Councils were basically town
bodies*

Sayeed. also argues that voters have been attracted

to the novelty of Basic Democracies, the promises of the
regime that the Basic Democrats would be effectively involved
in the exciting process of improving their lot in life# and
above all, they were attracted by the personality of Aywb
Khan*
The successful candidates represented a cross section
of the population#

Sayeed cites government figures^ to show

the following categories!

48,99$ farmers, 222 lawyers, 2,586

%ahlid a* Sayeed, "Pakistan’s Basie Democracies
Middle East Journal (Summer, 1961), p* 256*
2Ayufe Khan, "Pakistan Perspective," jjj>* eit** p« $52*
3Sayeed, "Pakistan’s Basic Democracies," og# eit*,
P* 256*
4IMd* , pp* 256«2$2*
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small businessmen, 391 ex-government servants, and 10 jour
nalists*

fha remainder were drawn fro® the artisan. class*

In spite of government efforts to keep the election
as non-political as possible , there were signs of political,
latimidatioa in the form of unopposed candidacies*

Consid

erable numbers of former politician* competed successfully*
and about 0 per cent of the total, membership of the Union
Councils were from this element of the populationo
the election results m m to. indicate that a respectable amber of Pakistanis identified with the regime and its
plans for Pakistan0
the newly elected Union Council* soon, gave Khan the
popular- support he had been seeking by extending to hi® a
vote of confidence*

At the .same time they requested hi® to

take steps to initiate constitutional government m m nor**
Immediately .following the election of the Basic
Democrats, Ayub Khan announced the creation of a Constitu
tion Commission*

It was headed by a member of the Supreme

Court and consisted of five members fro© both East and West
Pakistan#

the Commission members were charged with the

following' tasks
I* To examine the *progressive failure of parlia
mentary government in Pakistan leading to the abrogation
of the Constitution of 19$6, and to recommend how a
recurrence of similar cases can be prevented.*®
II* To submit proposals for a Constitution, taking
Into consideration the *genius of the people,® the

3?

general standard of education and. political judgement
in the country, the present state of nationhood, the
need for sustained development, and the effect of con
stitutional and administrative change© in recent month©#
3* the study would ©mho# recommendation© as to
how best the following ends could be achieved! (i) a
democracy ''adaptable to changed circumstances and based
on the Islamic principles of Justice, equality, and
tolerance** f {ill consolidation of national unity j and
{ill} a fins and stable goverimtejit,»

Khan claimed that he would **accept the Commission*s recom
mendations even if they were different from, my ideas provided
they are better than mine and good for the country..”2
A report m the Commissionf» findings were presented
to Khan on May 6, 1961*

Several disagreements between Khan

and the Commission were resolved in Khan *© favor#

The Coo*

mission had recommended a bicameral legislature! a vicepresident with some powers, from the other province from
which the president came; direct elections on the basis of
restricted adult franchise^ and separate electors#

Khan

accepted.the Commission*s suggestions regarding a presiden
tial form of government* the federal structure, and a focal
point of power,

however, he rejected the Commission's

advocacy of a bicameral legislature and a vice-president#
^Ayub Khan* Friends Hot Masters,
211

sit** pp# 210-

*

aiblriU, p. 212#

^Voting privileges were only to be extended to those
individual© who could comprehend the significance of a politi
cal election. This criteria for- voting continued to be a
controversial point among political groups*

It

The irrnmMm

was left to the legislature which

decided in 1964 to hate the Sasic Democrats serve as m
Electoral College to elect the national m i provincial
assemblies and the president#
Khan stated the reasons for his disagreement with
the Comalsalon's reeeaaieudiitieita of a vice-presidents

Be

argued that a vice-president, being the representative of
the other region or provinces would only complicate matters
by dividing rather thaw uniting the two reilons of the
country*

Be rejected the Commission's recommendation that

the president delegate power to the vice«*prosldent* Khan
deemed it necessary that the president have the complete
political picture before hi® as he was the individual who
would be responsible for all major decisions#

Be also felt

that the position of vice-president would, *inevitably#
create east-west controversies and set up factions within
the Presidential cabinet itself#**

In addition, if a strong

presidential candidate were coupled with a weak vice-*
presidential candidate, the elective judgement would be
confuted#

Khan also opposed a vice-presidency on the

grounds that a president should rely on his status and Image
to gain country wide support as a national figure and not
be dependent on the graces and support of a figure from
p. 2l6o
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mother region#**
t h m presented a recommendation to alleviate a
power vacuum upon the m h m m e or death of a president.#

So

proposed that* if the president were from one region* then
the Speaker of the National assembly should represent 'the
other region*^
Presidential power on financial matters m e also
settled.#

After Khan voiced his disagreement* a plan m m

adopted to minimise the causes for conflict between the
president .and the legislature#
two parts was adopted*

For- example* a budget with -

One part covered expenditures for

the administration and for continuing expenditures or doveJU
opteut programs- carried from the previous year? the other
part m m to cover all m m items of expenditure#

Seductions

in the expenditures of the first part would require the
consent of the president and any alterations in the second
part would require a vote by the legislature#3
In Its draft* the Constitution commission also protided for the impeachment of the president* governors*
ministers * chief Justices* and Judges of the Supreme Court#
the president could hr impeached, for gross misconduct or
willful violation of the. Constitution on a motion of a one*
11 b i d # , p. 215#

Slb&d.. p# 21d*
3lrticl.es 144 and 145* 1962* Pakistan Constitution#
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third of the elected ©embers of the legislature.

The presi

dent could be removed from his office if he were found
guilty by three-quarters of the total members of the legis
lature.

However, in order to prevent undue exploitation of

motions for impeachment, a resolution was adopted whereby
if less than one-half of the votes in the National Assembly
were in favor of impeachment* then the movers of the motion
would lose their seats in the Assembly.^
Bills and amendments to the Constitution were also
discussed by the Constitution Commission.

An amendment of

the Constitution would require the approval of the president
and a two-thirds majority.

If the president vetoed an amend

ment* then the amendment would be sent bach to the legisla
ture where a three-quarter majority vote could overrule the
presidential veto.

In the extreme case of a president again

refusing to sign an amendment, the president could resort
to submitting the amendment to a referendum by the entire
Ileetoral College who could then decide whether or not the
measure should be passed*2
Bills to amend the Constitution that would have the
effect of changing the boundaries of a province could not
be passed by the National Assembly unless concurred by a
*Articles 13 and 14* 1962 Pakistan Constitution.
2Articles 24, 2?* and 209, 1962 Pakistan Constitu
tion.
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two-*bhirds majority vote of the province concerned* *
After considerable discussion about these and other
features* the legislature and the president reached agrees
aent of the terns of the Constitution and the document was
promulgated on January 3* 1962*
tinder the terns of the Constitution* the legislature
of Pakistan would consist of one house in which each of the
two provinces would have equal representation• Hie total
membership of the assembly was fixed at 1$60 Each province
has 75 members*

the additional six are reserved for women

from the two provinces*
The Constitution is heavily executively*>oriantede
iupba describes it in the following words*2
The present constitution in Pakistan, has a large
degree of authoritarianism inherent in it® provisions*
The powers of the President art enormous and It ha©
been .maintained by various political elements that It
is very much short of a democratic constitution* The
denial of adult franchise to the people and the system
of indirect elections$ the inadequate application of
the principle of separation of power and particularly
the restraints of the judiciary* the facts that funds**
mental right® have been made non**justiciable and the
difficulties la amending, the Constitution are among
the various feature® which have .made many Pakistanis
feel, that nthis constitution only puts a new garb m
Martial Law* All the despotic powers which are held
by the Chief Martial lew Administrator had now been
carefully but cunningly vested in the President**
*Article 74 , 1962 Pakistan Constitution*
%lsir t» Oupta, "Political Issues and. Political
forces in Pakistan,” M E & r M & m
Ii£ii M M M *
CMsrch* i¥o4i* 57*
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fit© formulation of policy occurs in the president *a
%mlYe**mn cabinet and in his appointed secretariate

Each

ministry s of cow®#*, has a ministar and a permanent secre
tary , responsible for policy consideration in the area of
their jurisdiction,,*
the laws of Pakistan are applied and executed by the
bureaucracy which will he considered later.
In the %$&% ©eoatibubiofi arrangement, the provincial
governments are given a degree of autonomy? providing they
keep within the limit of policies set down by the central
administration,

T® minimise the chance of conflicting

policies, the provincial governor is appointed by the prosident,

fils ministers are also appointed with presidential

approval,
T® ensure national unity within the federal system,
the national Assembly stay legislate in areas reserved to
the 'province*' when it is in the national'interest to do a®.
It may do so in matters relating to:
1« The security of Pakistan, including the economic
and financial stability of Pakistani
2«

planning or coordination; or

.3# the achievement of uniformity in respect of any
matter in different parts of Pakistani so requires, the
Central legislature shall have the pmmr to make laws
(including laws having extra-territorial operation I for
?3, Amjad All| *8,000 Moral Kepublica,* Pakistan.
Quarterly, 1111 (Autumn and liftter* 1904), 94*
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the whole or any pert of Pakistan with respect to any
matter not m i r t U d in the third Schedule#1
the priaetf&m of national supremacy prevails in the event of
A conflict between national and provincial law*
Reports on the success of the first step Is the
mtehliehment of Basle Democracies* the Union Councils*
vary considerably,,

Bose analysts*, for example* dismiss

the® as powerless entities*^
this judgement, rests partly on Section 74 of the
Sasic Democracies Order which states that;
If* in the opinion of the Controlling: Authority* any«
thing is done or intended to be done by or on behalf of
« local vcouncil
v i m i k x x is u
vu x
u w
n x v i m x u y wx\*u
v*w xmm*
mr
a
not
in
conformity
with the
law* or
is in any
public interest* the Controlling
ngai
iy way against
ty may,
Authority
may* by orders
(a)
Quail"the
proceedings*
la) Quash the proceed
t any resolution passed
lb) suspend the execution of
or order made by the local council;
Co) prohibit the doing of anything proposed to be
done;
Id) require the local council to take such action
a# nay be specified#!
the Order also provides that a Union Council might be
displaced If they wars not functioning efficiently or h a w
acted In a maimer contrary to public interest# **4
* M

p# 2&2*

a t i £$• sli,** p
* 123*

% * Amjad All* £&* pit## p# 122* Goodnow* £g, pit#»
Be® also Gupta* £g« eft#* p# 52#

%)ie .1nt|c. ^leapcrapiea. gate* .Bmjasette. $JL MsOs&Sr
►aoSinary
7
*
Sited -'in
binary (let#3
fSt# jy* *v?v/rFF*
ffr^r^p
U M I C^ isyeei* ^Pakistan1! Basic .Democracy** illjiilp ggufe
Journal (Swisr, 1961), p, 254.
...

......................

^Sayeed, "Pakistan*® Basie D a c o c r a e y w . ctt..
P# 254*
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the m m

sophisticated middle class sad urban fe«U*

ers were frustrated by the restrictions- imposed by lasie
Democracies * they wished- to have m direct a vote as they
had enjoyed under the parliamentary system*

It was this,

section of the population which favored a return of politic
c&l partiess end the accompanying vital Involvement*1
The important fact to 'hear in mind B however# is
that the system of Basic Democracies was'created to arouse
a politically apathetic mass of illiterate peasants*

the

process of involvement was to he a gradual ono$ Khan mt*»
tainly did mot Intend that mens whose sphere of interest
extended little further than the local villages should be
able to exert considerable pressure on important domestic
issues*
Khan envisaged a stable form of politics in which
socio-economic conditions Improved at an impressive rate*
M those conditions improved# so would the level of democracy*
Thus, in the first stag# of development of democratic pro*
cess# the masses were to- learn to take Initiative at the
local level*

They were expected to assume minor responsi

bilities # plan future development# and organise coopera*
tlves*2

Elementary exercises la the execution of community
1The Time# /tbndoh7a December It# 19&4# p* %

•'*3* Atajad All#

alt** p. 122*
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betterment* it was hoped, would generate self-confidence*
In spite of the drawbacks, ease positive benefits
did flow from tbs Union Councils of Basic Democracies,,

They

linked local government to bfi# formal administrative appars*
bus*1 fhay offers training in, leadership- skills and stimu
lated self-help concepts*^

they helped, reduce the tradi

tional distrust of. the bureaucracy held by the masses«3
they subjected, officials to the scrutiny of elected rapra*
they provided am institutional framework
within which .specified tasks could be discharged^

they

coordinated .public, works and assisted la determining tins
availability of technical advice/*

4 tratolmg course to

rules of procedure sad the conduct of .public discussion
helped the Basic Democrat identify with the system

A

compulsory course was instituted in public relations for
all officials connected with the system*? Finally* by
including members of minority groups* women* for essample*
a more representative system was achieved**
9flw"^ii<>iiwpw><ei»<(www;wjirsi wigjimtrnimmtm*.

1L* F« Hushbrock Williams * "Basic Benottraeiea m
Institutions of local Government In Pakistan-IX** Journal
9 1 hmMl m m m m & m M m m & * n
imzi* m .
*>• 250*
% * 4mjad 411 * og0

3Ibid** p. 250*
P* 120*.

?Xbld»» p* 120*

^Lawrence Siring9 "'Pakistan then and How*
West,* lain (3prtog* 1 w ) » P»

last and

?B* P, Eusfebrook Williams* gg* cit«. p« 106,
^Choudhry and Khan* ©g* pit*. p* 106*
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Since- its inception in 1960, some changes hair# taken
plate in Basie Democracies, Union Council statue' was in**
creased when Khan designated that tier as an electoral body
for president and national and provincial assemblies*
Another change occurred when nominated and appointed
members were eliminated from the first and second tiers#

At

the third and fourth levels, the ratio of elected to appoin
ted members is still, equal#
The power of the Union Chairman in bh® structure has
been diluted#

A vice-chairman has been elected and certain

duties have been delegated to him.

The Union-Cbainnan Is

now liable for diaqualifleation when a two-third.® majority
of the Council are dissatisfied with the manner in which he
executes his responsibilities*'*
Elected vice-chairmen have also b & m introduced Into
the District Councils#

This has removed some of the power

wielded by %he government official,, the Deputy Commissioner
who was chairman of the District Council#

However, should

the elected vice-chairman, neglect, the responsibilities of
his position, ho, too, any be deposed by a two-thirds
majority vote of no-eonfidenoe#^
In November, 1961, a Rural larks Program, was imple
mented and within two years the District -and Union Council®
*3# Amjad All,
%
X
M
d
** p. 1
2
3
#

eft##

p.

121#

4?

were directly responsible for the planning and construction
of nnation building” projects.
asI

This included such items

schoolst land reclamation# small irrigation schemes„

low cost housing# and feeder roads.

In 1963*64* a total of

Hs300 million was allocated to the program.

Of this amountj

BfltlOO ©illion was spent directly by the Onion CouncilsJ
Although Khan was conscious of demands to introduce
a greater degree of democracy in his regime# he was not
willing to share his power to the extent that he would losecontrol of the power structure.

He was willing to search

for a formula# however, and for the system as a whole# cane
up with the device of Basic democracies# basically ah
scheme.
Introducing any serious element of democracy within
his regime proper was another matter*

Parliamentary govern*

'Beat had been tried in Pakistan# but It had failed*

Am a

form of government it was perhaps unsuited to the .political
realities of Pakistani political Immaturity and lack of
political experience in the sophisticated art of compromise
and party politics*

The masses of people were unable to

participate effectively because of poor communication and
their low literacy level*

The parliamentary system was

adopted at the outset simply because it was the only form
U f a M ., p, 1 2 3 ,
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of democracy with which the people m m

f»lllar*

Familiarity, however, does mot ensure success*

Tern

years of malfunction, corruption, and ineffectual perform*ante# particularly in the failure to produce a. constitution,
point to the inadequacy of the system*

It was terminated

by lhamss coup*
11a mew constitution, reflects his concern with a
possible repetition of the record.of the first tern years of
Pakistanis independence*

Is am authoritarian, t&ilitary

president, he simply could not tolerate a return to the
chaotic conditions of the earlier period*

the legislature *

therefore, was placed in & decidedly inferior position In
the regime, as m m the courts*
Khan was able to manipulate the destiny of Pakistan,
not only because of his charismatic qualities, but also be*
cause he lad a fir® power base in. the military forces*
role of the military will be the subject of the next
chapter*

The

CHAPTER If

fllE KOI! OF THS JfXUTART I» THE
MoosRHmnoH

effort

In certain states such m Indonesia and Jordan, the
military and political systems have a symbiotic relationship#
In other states., the two systems function apart*

When the

status quo changes, the observer la able to observe certain
changes in the power structure bteatte* there has been m
alteration in the guiding principles of the ruling system*
This particular section, is concerned with the changes that
occur when there is martial intrusion into civilian politics*
It will also take note &t the process of Involvement until
the time that the military has established itself a# an
oligarchic force#
the motives of a military revolution may be .gauged
by eaeu&ial&g the conditions in a society that enabled the
military to become a major political force*

In. many of the

states created after World far II, the military intrusion
Into the polities took place because there
is evidence that there are •weaknesses in them /the
statejy which are not compensated by those political
institutions which were inherited or established at
the moment of independence* these political institutions were mainly parliamentary! more or less demo
cratic* and liberal# Military rule la one of several
49
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practicable and apparently stable alternatives when
parliamentary, democratic regimes falter,,1
When the inherited political Institution* proved
ineiieetive end a. vacuum has been created in leadership,
the military can. be drawn in to fill the role of decision
maker, partly through patriotism, which may veil the true
motive® of a coup dfetat*

Patriotism is a necessary emotion

for the esprit 4s corps and loyalty of m array,. Therefores
when national security is at stake, even though the peril
may emanate internally, a well-disciplined, efficient, and
loyal army feels n& sense of national .mission transcending
parochial, regional, or economic interests# or kinship
ties#**2
On# cannot diasies# however# the personal .interest©
which m y be disguised as patriotism# Within the armed
forces of a country the interests of the senior officers#
and. the remainder of the recruit# may be different#

The

latter are concerned with "economic and social matters, the
most important of these being wage increases# security of
pensions# ©ecurement of lucrative office# in the bureaucracy#
?Edward Shils# wThe Military in the Political
Development of the lew States *# The, hi"
* '*
‘
-_— -r-.—
- -j* edited by John 77 Johnson'IPrincebom Pi^neeton ''university Press# 19&2}, p# %
%anfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern kttdmn and the
Hew Middle Class," The Role of ,
the
‘
Countries * on# cit## p# 296*

II

and, at times , security anti, special favors for their fami
lies*®*
the interests of the senior officers, m

the other

hand, often extended beyond the reals of personal ©coiiomlc
security*

Already an elite within an elite, they war® 4 m m

towards political involvement and thereby to an extension
of their power*

Eisenstadt points to four stages in which

the military aim to usurp power*
1* Political influence through- the appropriation
of advisory and bureaucratic positions*
2*

the concentration of political power*

3*

ffee control of the ruling elite*

&«

Seizure of realm and rule*2

On every occasion of military intervention Into
politics,-- the degree of involvement varies, as does the
intent*

In Latin America, for exawpie, the military govern

ments have been characterised by ^administrative incompetence,
inaction, and authoritarian, if sot reactionary values
In more recent time® and in a more widely universal aspect,
wth@ military involvement has been that of a dynamic and
asIf-saerificing leadership committed to- progress and the
% * 1* Biaeasbadt, fhg foMticsl Systemp, of £g& Jg*
sires (Londons Goiiler«lfemlIaii £55-* , vSwgtT* p* Wl«
told** p* 172*
liucian V, Py®, Aspects o£ Political toeloiaiinb.
(Bostons Little, Brown, and Co*, Ttqo I, p* i/j*

m

m

i

i
'When compelled to at®Is outside their society 'tor a model
of development* th# military leaitri become acutely aware
of the needs of modernisation and technological advaoeaawat«3
Therefore, their training baa emphasized the need for tech-
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the elite is replace*! by that of another and a new power
base is rapidly established in order that the new elite*©
position may be solidified,,
The Immediate effect of military intrusion into
civilian politics are readily visible * .particularly when the
military M s taken over fro© inefficient .politicians#
stitutional forms of government are abrogated#

Con

'this includes

the outlawing of political parties* and the "ordinary organs
Of .public ©pinion are forced Into a state of attrition#"^
The enforcement of law and order and the elimination of
political corruption are readily achieved by a military
power#2
The show of maintaining order and reducing corruption
helps the regime to garner popular- support* and it is through
this means* rather than, ideological dogma, that a military
government initially wins favor*

It cannot win total accept-

aacs because the ousted elite cannot be placated nor m m all
sections of society become mobilized because "traditional
attachments are tremendously resilient#1’!

These pockets of

potential opposition cause the military to become more
authoritarian and eventually to assume complete control*
its very nature* a military force looks upon "dispersed
authority as intolerable#1^
’M i * . P. 55.

zIMi.» P- 55.
4H M « »

p. 5*.

By

54

Mo matter how strongly a unitary government feels
it must not dilate or share power; political systems repairs
the services of an experienced administrative bureaucracy;
%v©n though it denounces* purges, and transforms it, the
elite will eventually be forced into a coalition -with the
civil service**^

furthermore. If comparative stability is

established, and there is order within the nation, the
military must begin to formulate a program of social and
economic Improvement to retain their popular has© of support*
this requires the assistance of the civil service, for it
1® the administrative bureaucracy which implements new pro
grams0
throughout SMls1 discussion of the military role
in a political system.# he m m the word wcar©taking^

He

describes the military oligarchy as directionless and argues
that they have % o definite conception of the kind of regime
to which- they wish to transfer power or toward which they
wish to move 01,2
In the ensuing discussion of the military .in Pakistan,
it will become evident that certain aspects of the regime
are In accord with the theoretical framework*

Other aspects

are not compatible because the- .human, element, in this case
•the administrator of the oligarchy,, places their_own limita
tions on that pattern*
.

■

>

11bid.. p. 57.

2lbl<t.. $>» 59.
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Gf the elite groups to Pakistan* the military has.

experienced the shortest existence a® a unified body*

though

Moslems had served as members of the British Indian Army for
more than %m

hundred years., there was not, at the time Of

partition, a single .separate Muslim combatant unit*

The

British had purposely subscribed to this polity following
the Sepoy Mutiny of 165? in which the Muslim soldiers re*
volted against their British officers*

Fro® this point on ■

Muslims were dispersed throughout the Indian. Army to proper**
tions that -prevented the® fro® becoming the dominant group
to a unit.
Initially, it was the aim of the Brittoll to have
the' Indian. Army intact for the first five years of Indian
and Pakistani independence*

It was felt that such a pro*

cedure would increase the efficiency with which troops could
be serrated,

toe Hindus agreed to this plan, but the Stas**

lias vehemently opposed it and as a'result the separation of
the British Indian Army was .moved up to April 1, 1946,

At

the time of partition, Muslim military forces were estimated
at 150,000 officers and men, all of who® were scattered
throughout the subcontinent#
The officers and sen returning to the Muslim regions
formed a disorganised and uaderaraed military force#

tinder

the terms of the partition agreement, arms left by the
vacating British forces were to be divided proportionally
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between the t m countries« However, as the majority of
supply depot# m m

located in what was m w Indian territory,

the Ntwlittd did not receive what they considered was their
proper allotment*

The reluctance of the Indian government

to distribute .arms to Pakistani force# rest## primarily upon
the fact that seen after partition m

armed conflict arose

between India and Pakistan over the territory of Kashmir*
to complicate the organization of the army, there
was a shortage of. officers*

It had been the policy of the

British to appoint to the major ranks, persons of British
origin in order to prevent a *nativ** from eoMaadiag a
.military wit*

Since the Muslims m m

trusted less than

the Hindu#, there were naturally fewer Muslims holding the
rank of officer than either the British or Hindus*
Disorganized, understaffed, and badly supplied as
it was, the Army was still entrusted with a wide variety
ef duties*

It was called upon to fill the depleted rank#

of the civil service, maintain law sad order, protect the
refugee movement sad administer to the refugees fro®.India
and to defend the ill»defined borders against raids*

These

were difficult- tasks to beqimth to any group, but the Army
responded well to the challenge and as a result became the
recipient of praise*
The adulation bestowed upon the military was at
first confined primarily to the Western wing of Pakistan*
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The major recruiting are# for the British Indian Army .had

been the Bind an# Punjab province# of West Pakistan*' The
reason-why this area ha# hear such a. heavy recruiting groin#
was that it ha# bee®. settle# by the former warrior class
that ha# ridden with the ffusliia armies^

is so many officers an# men of the Pakistani Army
came .fro® the Western Province« the armed forces m m
aider©# to be foreigners by the East Pakistanis*

com*

There was#

In 1955» only 14 of the 908 officers with the rank of major
or above who were fro® Sash Pakistan*

There was the same

ratio in the sister services; 60 m % of 700 in the Air.
an# ■? out of 600 naval officers were last Pakistanis*

flow**

ever* the popularity of the -Army increase# in last Pakistan
after 1957 because of the effective assistance it renders#
to the civil authorities in suppressing smuggling aehivi**
ties*

The suppression of smuggling brought about lower food

prices which ha# spiral©# to such an extent that approsdU*
©ately cne*half of a peasant *n .income bad to be spent on
food products*^
The organisation an# modernization of the Army was
left to its officers.* an upper an# middle class oriented
group who had receive# a western oriented education*
1Wilcox, ££>„ eit* * p* #|*.

SFasal Muquese* Khan-, the Story of the Pakistan A r m
(Karachi t Oxford "University W a i , Ifbfj* p« 'ffg™rTrn

9$
Gradual progress was mad© to the .point where the Pakistani
Army became a highly mobile fighting force#

The success in

establishing a formidable fighting force amid the political
chaos has been attributed to the independence which the
military was granted'by the government In asking its own
decisions#

!#o government agency had my significant in

fluence over the military services*
recruiting* training*- and assignment*

The Army did its own
They ware disciplined*

well-equipped {particularly after 1956 when United States
military aid began to arrive) and appeared to be admired and
respected by ail segments of the Pakistan population,*

About

one-third of the overall expenditures of the central and
provincial governments in 1956-57 was allocated to the mili
tary
In spite of the Amsy*s power* there was no indica
tion in 195$ that its leaders wished to enter politics or to
take over the government administration#

the senior offi

cers* trained in the British tradition* had been taught
to eschew politics and to take their orders from the consti
tuted civil authorities*

They had often been called upon

to restore public order when the .police had been unable to
do so* but they had withdrawn from this policing role at
*There are many conflicting figures given on the
allocation to defease purposes* fie low and high given are
from 30 to 10 p m cent of the total budget#
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the first opportunity*1
The military did not completely refrain fro® enter**
lug civilian politics*

In 1951# Prime Minister H i Khan's

Office uncovered a conspiracy of a faction of military and
civilian officials who were plotting to seise control of the
military m i then ultimately the govtrantst#

the leaders of

the conspiracy were arrested end brought to trial*
were convicted and sentenced*

They

The prestige of the Army re**

ceived a heavy blow even though the conspiracy failed*^
The Bawalpindi Conspiracy as it was called 9

emo

about two or three months after the appointment of General
Ayuts Khan as Cottseuu$er*ln~Chtef of the Army*

Khan professed

horror at the discovery of subversive officers within the
ranks of the Aray*

After the conspirators were sentenced v

Khan proceeded to purge the military of other officers whose
loyalty to Pakistan and the Army was in doubt*
inforced discipline and embarked m

He then re*

extensive training pro

grams with the purpose of restoring popular confidence in
the Amy*3
In 1954 » Governor General Ghulaa Mohamad hlMMlf *
suggested to the Army that it take control of the country*
iQoodnowj, jog* eit*B p# 104*
% u l » Khan, frlgnds Rot MaBtera, ££. £ & . ,

3Ibid.. p. 52.

P» 39,

m
Xhwfr* to whoa the offor was made, refused*

He told the

Governor General:
I m are being reckless and you will do the country
Immense harm* 1 am engaged in building up the amy*
We hare m enemy* an implacable enemy in India* * * #
I can serve this country better in my profession*i
la the political situation degenerated into chaos *
the military- was left no alternativej something had to- be
done to save Pakistan*

the October* 195$ coup d'etat brought

the military to power because the politicians had not been
able to check the political and economic chaos which Pakistan
was experiencing*2'
It should p however* be noted- that the military
take-over in Pakistan was not an abrupt development,
nor did it signify the elevation in status hierarchy
of Pakistan- of any underprivileged group*?
the £*pe*lt&0& of martial law was announced, by
President Mirza* who* it will be retailed * dissolved the
Provincial and Central Assemblies * abrogated the Constitu
tion and abolished political parties*

the coup* or what is

acre frequently referred to as the devolution * involved
little movement of troops*

It was a peaceful* almost blood**

le«® operation in which Aynfe Khan expressed the desire that
"the people should settle down very quickly and get on with
p.

5a*

%haa*
%uptat &£* £&&•• P*

m * £&*» P« ?©*

m
the rtcoiutanMtlon of the country#**

He felt that martial

law "would have assumed a negative complexion*1^' if it had
been used for punitive and repressive means«
Shan’s determination to rehabilitate the civil
administration indicates the vain# he placed: on the civil
service« On the other hand s Shan could for###© the probIt®# of involving the Army too deeply in civil administra
tion for h© believed that "the A m y would be destroyed If
it got too mixed up in running, civil aiminictration*1*^ There
fore, on# of Shan’s initial action# was to m e t with S©cr#»
taries to the Central Government and explain the actions
and objectives of the revolution# Harbin! law, while giving,
support to the civil authority* would at th# same time sub
ject it to the supervision of th# two military provincial

governors#
M

is difficult to determine the extant to which th©

Army has acted a# a modernising agent in Pakistan#

Gupta

stab©# that th* Army was not a ■odmlsing ©lit# feecaus#,
•th* bop officer*# group in m m % armlet in th© developing

region# * including Pakistan., often represents th# land-owning
class and may be committed bo the preservation of all
%han, Friends Hot Masters# on# pit,#, p* 72#
2IM4* » P* 72*
3lbid., Po 77#
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erstwhile privileges and social relationships*
fa further substantiate bia claim* he generalizes
that the Array is often weak in the shills naeasaaxy to
modernize a society and therefore wist work la association
with the intelligentsia*

la the case of Pakistans the- in®

telllgentsia advocates Western parliamentary proceduresg
therefore» the two groups cannot be readily aligned*2
In contradiction to Oupt&’a primary hypothesis is
the fact that within three months of baking over the govern®
ment * 'th© rec©amendations of th© Land Reform Commission were
announced*

Immediate: steps to put the recommendations into

effect m m

taken*

This included the breakup of larger as®

bates with an upper limit set on the number of productive
"unit® a landlord could hold*^

In th© redistribution of

land* lb was hoped that a m w agricultural middle class would
develops

Over 6#000 landlords lost over two and one«half

million acres*
Khan declared his intentions of improving social and
■economic conditions and these appear- to have been genuine
in the light of the reforms he has adopted as suggested by
%upta, jgg* oft** j>« 51*
2lMd-. pp. 51-523a unit varied from region bo region according to
productivity* but no specific information is available*.
iKfean, ffrfenda Hot Masters* Q£a

P* 9®*
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th* Commissions* Within th® first year, tea commissions
were- established mad before another twelve months had
elapsed* the results of the Commissions on Credit* national
Mutation* Maritime and th# location of th# Motional Cap!**
tol were submitted J
Although social reform has not been dynamic * the
military regime of Khan has mad# definite steps to imple
ment social and economic improvements is association with
improvements in technology# th* establishment of a .sound
economic tease is essential to a developing nation* This
criteria was one of the influencing factors which propelled
the military elite to take over the government of Pakistan*
for* In 195$« the nation was

m

the brink of bankruptcy#

the British had given little encouragement to th#
development of domestic economy in India* this was- a re*
flection of British mercantile policy* After partition»
only ten per cent of th# total industrial units were located
la Pakistan and this Mounted to 1*406 unit# employing, few
people and these mainly ©a a seasonal teasis*^ there was
little capital available and few technicians* Apart from
cottage industries which were traded, mainly In the environs
of th# village* most industry involved th® processing of
libido, Appendix f *

%asic Facts (Karachi: Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting* Government of Pakistan# 1964)# p* 4t«
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r m mUmimlm*

Without substantial government aid in in-

vestment and leadership# industrial and economic growth
would be alow# for "most Moslem capitalists had tradition*
allf been traders# and enterprise still turns more swiftly
to commerce rather than industry*11?
Pakistan was la a hurry1to accomplish definite steps
towards economic modernisation and social betterment* which
developing nations regard as imperative#

A crucial decision

facing all countries who wish to industrial!!# is whether
it should be concerned with the processing of raw materials
or if there should be a development of heavy industry*2

Th#

test# and inexperience of the civil administration in indus
trial and economic matters resulted in the failure of the
first Six Tear ft»** which finally had to be dropped four
years after its inception*

A five Tear Plan ($$55*60) was

not successful either# and the final years, were reorganised
by Ayub Khan# who instituted a'more attainable two-year
Priority Flan#
After careful consideration# a Second five Tear Flan
was adopted in I960*

This plan proved to be far more realis

tic and more successful#

The results nearly reached the

objectives outlined# and the government earned th® confidence
%pate#

p, 111#

^Outlook m .Development {Karachi* The Department of
Film# and Publications# Government of Pakistan# n*d*), p» 1*

6$
of economic spheres both within the nation and overseas*
ISm aehlevesients of the Second five fear Plan are apparent
In the following f i g u r e s T h e gross national product in
creased a total of 29 per cent over the anticipated 24 per
cent*

Agricultural production was disappointing* tout did

rise by 2*1 per cent over the Inoroftco rate of the 1950s*
The Manufacturing showed an annual growth rate of 14*6 per
cent*

Export earnings increased 7 per cent annually against

the projected annual increase of 1 .per cent*

Domestic sav

ings exceeded the projected our by Is* 476 crones*2

Pride

was expressed in the fact that foreign aid for the project*
such as World Mmk loans was reduced frea 50 per cent to
|d per cent*
In the drive to achieve the economic goals* strict
import controls had be be levied*- Credit regulation# were
also necessary* a# was some tax relief to encourage industry*
One result of the economic .growth was that more Jobs have
been created within the bureaucratic and technical fields*
the actual degree of growth is the direct reflection
of the nation*# #developB«nt strategy and the policies that
subserve it and th® adequacy of the institution# guarding
and conducting economic activities **3 Those who direct th©

2z jmSwpm&i m* sii». ?• ’5.
%»ib of ten million*
^Xbjld*» p* 4*
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eeostoiaie activity in Pakistan are responsible to the presi
dent awl fraction through the Financial Ministry awI the
President*s Secretariat*

la addition , there are a timber of

government sponsored commissions which vary in importance awl
influence*

An example &f ouch is the Pakistan Planting

Commission which authors the Five tear Plans*'*

there are

also government corporations which have been created to
boost protection*

the types of activities and leadership

varies as tees the financial resources* but they are gen
erally commercial operations involved in the fields of
industry* agriculture, water, and power development
fhe third Five Tear Flan was implemented in 1965
■end was. the first stage In a twenty-year projection of
priorities necessary to develop a self-sustaining economy*
In mid-196? the expected rise of 5*2 per cent in the gross
national protect showed that the pace of economic develop
ment had not slackened*^

%laslhu»-s&man, ^

eft** pp* 92-95*

% h a l M B* Ssyeedi *Pakistan: lew Challenges to the
Political. S y s t e m Asian Survey * ¥IT, lo* 2 {Feb., 1966), 97*
3Tlae M&gaatne * August 25, 1967, Fol. 10, Ho. 0, p* 1#*
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THE CIVIL SmtXCB II THE

EFFORT

A bureaucracy evolve* Oh* principles by which lb
operates*

These principles sot the pattern for the autonomy

and the professional standards that dictate the degree of
implementation of laws and policies that the bureaucracy
makes**
The primary concern of & bureaucracy is the freedom
It ©an. gain from the apex; of the power structure*

To achieve

this aim* a sphere of professionalism in government adminis
tration was established which contrasted to the ”raore ehar&a*
antic or traditional legitimation of the ruling elite*”
Thus* the policies of a bureaucracy become firmly entrenched*
while political .policies may fluctuate according to the
whims of the ruler*2
The framework which is evolved by a bureaucracy*
through which it operates,.influences the participation of
the bureaucracy in the output of a political system*

It is.

through this framework that the bureaucracy makes its output?
Is* I* Liaenstadt* o&» ©it*.* p* 159*
2Ibid*. p* 159*
^Outputs represent the decisions and: policies of the
government, Pereas input refers to the demands 'and interest
of the people brought into- the political system with the in
tent of influencing the outputs of the governing groups*

m
ansi the strength of a bureaucracy can he gauged by the
degree in which it monopolizes output*1
Essential to this process is a source i r m which
broad policy emanates * the directive influence cones from
the -ruling elite and can vary according to the authority
wielded by the elibe*^
'Where the ruling elite displays strength, it can
exert pressures on the bureaucracy to adhere strictly to
policy*

This say he achieved by placing individuals or

groups of individuals responsible to the ruling elite .into
the hierarchy of the bureaucratic framework*3 %% can also
be achieved by dispensing with the official decision-making
body*

Almost the same result m y be gained through playing

one section of the bureaucracy against the otherA
Regardless of the extent to which the bureaucracy
is regulated |, the adainistration of a state depends upon
that bureaucracy*

therefore, It will be instrumental to

varying degree® in the Implementation of policy*^
Where a .ruling, elite is beset by dissension, or
1Gabriel A* Aliasnd and §* Binghas Powells Compara
tive Polities? ,<4 Development Approach (Boston? 'Little,
Wown aMGoipany» T9©6), p* 1§3*
% b l d « « p* 1 0 ,

% M L ® , m * M k * * P« 57.

%Lsenstadt, <|g# ett*» p0 161*
$3hllaf

cit*# p* 57*
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where directives to th# administrative bureaucracy
are hot
i
clearly defined» there will be a considerable leeway in the
interpretation of polity*

It la in this situation that the

bureaucracy la able to Interpret and enforce policies me*
cording to Its own criteria.*’*
this study is primarily concerned with about four
hundred and tern persons who collectively- constitute the
Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) or the administrative
elite*

The CSP can best be understood by reviewing its

history as m institution*

it Is the successor in Pakistan

of the famous Indian Civil Service, which can trace its
origins back to- the year 1600, when Queen Elisabeth X author*#
imd the incorporation of a private trading company which
became known as the East Indian Company.,

In 1&53# #&•» the

Company*# charter was renewed for the last time,, the British
Parliament,stipulated that appointments to the higher posi
tions were to be made on the basis of competitive ©stamina*.
tlon$«

The examinations stressed academic knowledge in th®

liberal arts subject# and contained many option# ■§© that th®
applicant could demonstrate hi.® proficiency in his major
college courses*

Civil Service examinations in India and

Pakistan have retained the academic emphasis to this day*2
The Indian Civil Service {ISC) was the most important
*Almond and Power, ©£» .cit»s p„ 154*
20oodnow, ££* clt** »* 32*

instrument ©£ British control In India.

Almost all of th©

top administrative and judicial positions were hold by
Indian Civil Service officers#

Even th©' provincial gover

nors ner© frequently drawn from it® ranks#

In accordant©

with British practice , th© police and military services
m m

subordinated to the civil authorities#

thus, th# Civil

Sarvlo© officers were the men who ruled India; they war©
responsible only to th© Governor-General of India and th#
British Government#1
fh# leaders of Pakistan » confronted with drastic
needs for administrative personnel, turned naturally to those
individual® who had. served with th# Indian Civil Service**
the Civil Service of Pakistan la the successor in
Pakistan of the Indian Civil Service, which was the
most distinguished Civil Service in the world# Although
the largest of the Superior Services, it Is a body of a
£ m hundred only*. Hut it consists of m m who, under
ministerial and legislative direction, ©nereis# many of
th# most important functions of government and on whom,
subject to such direction, lies the prime responsibility,
well-being and good government of their country#3
the few hundred did not have a complete monopoly on
all the important administrative positions.

These indi

viduals were part of the so-called Central Superior Service's,
which also included th# Pakistan foreign Service, the Police
1Arthur Vincent Smith, Thm Oxford History of India
(OxfordI Clarendon Press, 19231# pi^oSA-S^V
2Almond and Coleman, g&<, cit#, p« 237#
31?Careers in th# Pakistan Superior Services
The.
Secretariat latabliakaent Division (Karachi, 1951),
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Service» the Audits and Accounts Service of a fax Collector ,
the Bailway Service., and. the Postal Service*

two of the

services mentioned above, the Police Service of Pakistan
and the Civil Service of Pakistan bore the major responsi
bility for the preservation of law and order*

Although the

administrative officer generally outranked his police counter
part and could give him orders In an emergency situation, h®
usually refrained from interfering with police operations*
The British had developed a. Civil Service primarily
to maintain law and order and the collection of revenue*

If

the revenues were collected and order was "preserved, the
peasants were allowed to lead their lives in the manner to
which they had become accustomed for two thousand years*

To

the British the establishment of law and order was para
mount*
It is not for those who live in acre fortunate
countries to underestimate the vital importance of a
system that effectively preserves law and order* Bo
district officer could forget how close to anarchy lay
the communities under his supervision. Be had to- he
continuously aware that his action within a matter of
minutes sight make the difference between a display of
had temper,and a serious riot involving scores of live®

and homes**

The sen. who entered the service did so at an early
age and m m

Immediately given considerable responsibility*

Often they were' told to proceed with their Jobs without
1Callsrd, 2£, clt.. p. 287.
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waiting for orders fro® above,'*'

Clerical positions

mi

personnel were also under the Civil Service mi were re*
bruited by competitive examinations.

Most of the better

clerical jobs required a bachelor's degree although the
chances of being promoted fro®, one of these offices to a
Superior Service post were poor,. Finally, at the bottom
-of the hierarchy were a large number of-menial employees**
the messengers guards servants and various manual, workers.
Although no accurate figures on the number of
civilian employees can be given, a very rough estimate, of
the number of civilians employed by Pakistan government la
1957 would be about 650,000,

Out of this number employed.

Perhaps lees than 1,000 held key decision-making posts,2
Members of the legislatures were prevented from
interfering with the bureaucracy.

Initially, the autonomy

which the CSP enjoyed was a carry-over from th© practice of
th© Indian Civil Service,

Th# aim there was to protect

British appointed civil servants against possible hostili
ties from an Indian cabinet or legislature,

Under the

provision of the Coverm e a t of India Act a public servant
should not be punished by provincial authorities,

If any

disciplinarian action were to be taken, the civil servant
1Ibid,, p, 267,
2Ibid,, p. 292,

n
was still, given the opportunity to defend himself and was
satitfed to at least one appeal if .ha were found guilty* 1
this custom was written into Chapter 1 of the 1956 Constitu
tion * This chapter of the Constitution was- designed to
insulate the high civil officers from political influence«
To alter the status and protection which the- Civil Service
enjoyed, an amendment to the Constitution would he required*
The Constitution further provided that appointments to the
higher administrative positions be made by the president or
someone designated by him.* In. the face of these constitu
tional barriers, the elected representatives were in a rela
tively weak position, vis-a-vis the bureaucracy*

Their

Influence over the permanent personnel was confined to the
transfer of a disagreeable civil servant from one post to
another#
toother element of strength of the Civil Service was
the inherent weakness of the elected assemblies*

The politi

cal experience of the politicians had been relatively short;
the senior civil servant on the other hand had long been
accustomed to power and prestige#

The civil servants felt

that if responsible gov@rn.stnt were to break down* the civil
service would have to take over the full powers of govern
ment#
*lbid«* p* 294*

fender these circumstances the civil servants have fetes
•t least the equals of cabinet ministers, and their
education and experience of administration has often,
rendered the® their superiors* this state -of affairs
that can find a final remedy only whoa cabinet govern
ment M s been successfully established at the center
and in the provinces**
Weaknesses did exist In the Civil Service system*

the small number of experienced officers which Pakistan
M d at partition necessitated the appointment of new personnel, many of then unqualified*

Furthermore* the adminis

trative system developed fey the British in the latter half
of the nineteenth century* and the changes introduced during
the last forty years of British rule amounted to modifica
tions rather than drastic reformation*

this attitude toward

change was adopted fey the Pakistan Civil Service*

the pri

mary objective of the Civil Service seemed to fee that of
keeping the existing institutions .functioning smoothly rather
than introducing Innovations*®
the most severe criticism of the Civil Service is
the charge of corruption .among the public servants*

Corrup

tion took two forms* political and criminal*
'The political influence of government servant# is
very great* An illiterate voter 1# ready to believe
that he should do whatever he is told fey government*
And the powers of a District Magistrate asm either aid
or hinder the candidacy of a politician* Consequently*
political pressure has been at work to persuade or
Mallard* o£„ cit*, p» 296*
2Ibld**. p. 296*
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compel! government servants to intervene la party
politic®J
Ant official who did m % respond to the political pressure#
faced the possibility of feeing transferred to m undesirable
pact*

the civil servants recognised the danger, end through

the Council of Administration, recommended to the government
that ^tenures for nost of the appointments should be fixed
end transfers before the expiry of tenure should fee rare*
transfers should not be sad* as a matter of punishment*11^
'the power of the Civil Service extended into the
business sector to such m extent that individual fortunes
could fee- won according to the gratuities granted 'fey the
service*

Because there existed a shortage of staff members ,

many of these officials operated without supervision or
control*

the government attempted to curtail illicit tran

sactions fey inaugurating two actsi

Prevention of Corruption

Act, 1947 and the Special Police Establishment let 194$*
These lets were created to investigate and bring to trial
cases in which bribery awl corruption had taken place in
the Central and Provincial Governmentso

In more than five

years, 5,000 corruption cases were brought before the
courts*

However, less than' one in ten of the accused were
1£Md, & j>* 297*

tration

2Iiowiand Egger, Th§. ImarovMMiiat. M .Public AdttAiilaF§fe||g, P* 1J7 cited ln cSllerd, j ^ * 7 p * $ 9 7 *
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convicted.

In 194$* Blast Bengal established a similar

Anti-Corruption Department*

Of the 6,160 cases, 2*3#$

resulted in convictions**
In 1953 further action was taken under the Preven
tion of Corruption Act#

Under the rules m

officer was

presumed to be guilty of corruption if rumors persisted that
the official was corrupt,

Also, if the officer or his

dependents were unable to account for property they held,
or they were judged to be living beyond their visible means
of support* the officer was assumed to be corrupt*2
toy criticism of the public services in Pakistan must
be set against one paramount fact; the machinery of
government has continued to function through ten years
of extraordinary difficulty* This has been due almost
entirely to the work of the services*, for the quality
of the political leadership has been neither high or
vigorous* The public has become Inured to the idea that
the politicians are corrupt, but it can still bo in
censed by the revelation of the betrayal of trust by a
civil servant #3
In Pakistan, the judiciary# except for the Supreme
Court* is .part of the Civil Service*

Recruitment for the

High, district, m i Sessions courts is divided between the
CSP and the Sar*

To be qualified for an appointment to the

High Court, an individual is required to have been advocate
for at least ten years, or a aembir of the CSP for the m m
^Canard, £j>* pit*« p. 29$#
2Ibid#* p* 29#*
H b t i * * p* 29$*
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period and served as a District Judge for at least three
years*

Appointments are made by the President after eon-

saltation with the Chief Justice,

To qualify for the

Supreme Court the minimum standard is five years on a High
Court or fifteen years as an Advocate*
The District Magistrate is a CO? officer who has
Jurisdiction in both criminal and revenue cases*
main duties lay In the field of administration*

But his
After a

period of service he could request m transfer' to the Judi
cial Branch
The fact that many of the Judges in Pakistan are mem
bers of the C3P and have had experience as administra- .
tive officials means that the courts have a substantial
degree of sympathy for the needs of government. But,
once a judge is appointed he guarantees security of
tenure* A judge of a High Court may be removed only
by a resolution supported by two-thirds of the members
of a National Assembly,*
Attempts were mad# in 1954 to separate th© judicial
and executive functions of th# District Magistrate,

Formerly

the District f%gistrat# was responsible for making rules,.
enforcing them, and punishing their violation,
adopted to separate these functions*

A plan was

Each district was

assigned an additional District Magistrate to preside over
judicial functions*

It became .his responsibility to hear

appeals from lesser magistrates and handle original cases
1Xbld., p* 299,
2Ibid,, p* 300.
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under the Pakistan Penal Code*
the judiciary retained a high degree of independence
despite the military take-over in 195$*

To ensure that the

executive and the legislature acted with the provisions of
the constitution,. Ayub Khan advocated the establishment of
an independent judiciary#**
cial review*

But without the power of judi

A& defined, the Supreme Court would ttadvise

the president when a question of law has arisen or is likely
t© arise which is of public importance.112 However, the
advisory opinion was binding on neither the president or the
lower courts#
The present government has respected judicial deci
sions*

In 1964 the leaders of the Jamraat-i-Islami, a power

ful, orthodox, Muslim political party, were arrested for
leading an unlawful association*

Arriving at a decision

under Section 6 of the Political Parties Apt 1962, the
Supreme Court ruled that the action of the government was
invalid and that the leaders were being unlawfully retained#
The government accepted the court’s decision and the men
were released*!
As was mentioned earlier in this section, the C3F
inherited many of its institutional characteristics from
1'Ayiib K h m, M i M a M

ItlifEi* m * M M s * P* 199*

2Fass!ul laque Kesri., MJudicial Independence in
Pakistan,”
MmM M Uuguot, 19671, p* 26#
3The Times /i@m4m7« September 29, 1964*
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its predecessor, the Indian Civil Service.

Indeed, the

resemblance was striking no matter whether one looks at the
organization and procedures or the recreational activities
and social habits of the higher civil servants,

the ICS was

devised as a system of control by an alien pewar* and there
is considerable agreement that It was a highly successful
institution#

Seldom in history have so many been governed

and ruled by so few,1
However* it is necessary to ask whether a system
devised to serve the British in India served equally well
when transferred to Pakistan*

The answer is not surprising*

The transplanted institutions worked reasonably well.

Con

ditions were favorable in Pakistan, because its people were
used to the system and not familiar with any other.

The

Pakistan version of the ICS was successful la bringing a
degree of order out of chaos,

The revenues were collected*

and. other traditional functions were carried on in much the
same way as before partition*

These were major accomplish-

©eats*
However* the bad features of British administration
in India as well as the good.* were evident in the transplan
ted institution*

The G3P, like the ICS, was autonomous*

It

controlled its own recruitment, training and indoctrination*
1Callard* £ d , git., p. 2$4*
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disciplinary procedures, performance ratings* promotions and
transfers# and administrative investigations*

In the Inter-

oats of public tranquility# it sometimes prevented public
meetings or silenced the press# and occasionally an un
cooperative politician was placed in jail,

It might be

argued that the CSP was subject to even less control than
the ICS because the latter had been tinder the critical eye
of the Secretary of State for India, and important policy
questions were subject to review by the Cabinet or even the
British Parliament*

Pakistan's national and provincial

legislatures were inexperienced and preoccupied with other
matters*

It occasionally criticised the CSP, but the legis

latures could not control it because the higher services
had been given considerable protection against political
influence under the Indian Act and the 1956 constitution*
To protect competence, responsiveness was sacrificed,^
Although neither the ICS nor the CSP was effectively
controlled by any representative institution in India or
Pakistan# the ICS was always subject to the orders of the
British government, The ICS might do as it pleased in India
for considerable periods of time# but sooner or later a
governmental commission would be sent from London to look
into the administration of India,

The authority of the

J, H«wman» nThe Constitutional Evolution of
Pakistan*H International Affairs* XIX¥X, Ho, 3 {duly, 1962)«
156*

*1

British government to intervene wight occasionally be
resented, but it could not be seriously questioned*

The

CSP, on the other hand, was not subject to any comparable

control either inside or outside of Pakistan*

It is never

easy to force change on a strong bureaucracyj in Pakistan
there was. no representative institution strong, enough to do
that job, so the CSP continued to follow procedures and
practices that were no longer appropriate under a republican
fora of government that was striving to prostate national
development,

thus both the machinery of government and the

attitudes of those who filled the higher positions seemed
better adapted to meet the problems of a previous era than,
the problems which confronted Pakistan in 195#-«

UrnfiteU 3smkm M m mJMrnx M a
Although President Ayub Khan acknowledged the vital
role of the civil services and repeatedly said that military
rule would enable them to get on with their business without
political interference | one of the main theses of his program;
was the elimination of corruption and inefficiency In the
public serviced

To this end, the President set up a

t*One of the major objectives of the Revolution was
the cleaning up of the public life of Pakistan* So far as
the Services are concerned* there were well-known complaints
of corruption,- misconduct {in the form of favoritism and
nepotism) and the inefficiency of some of the Government ser
vants* But the rules which then existed were so lax as t©
make it almost impossible to remove a public servant for mis
conduct or inefficiency*” (Pakistan lews M m m % * duly 1, 1959*)

#a
acreeniiig committee m mrlf as Hovember* 195# to assess the
efficiency and integrity of official® and the clerical staff
of the Central Government,,

In general, the line of command

was followed; civil, servants reviewed the records ©f ether
civil service employees who were subordinate in rank*

If a

screening committee decided that there was a case against an
official* he would be given the opportunity to defend himself
orally and in writing and would have the right to .appeal to
a special committee created for the purpose*

The goal was

not only to weed out undesirable elements but also to deter
public servants from indulging in .malpractices in the future*
la the three-week period ending July 7* 1f59* more
than 2*000 federal and provincial officers were removed fro®
office or otherwise punished:
Of the 1*660 Federal Civil Service officers punished*
#19 were dismissed or compulsorily retired* They ranged
from a Charge d fAffairs® abroad who was retired because
of inefficiency to- senior secretaries of Government*
police officers and those belonging to the once notori
ously corrupt Supply Department# * * * Other® were de
moted or placed on probation* Those retired were
allowed pensions due to- them under service rules*1
However * for the most part.* dismissals and eoapulsary re
tirements* and reduction in rank was most prevalent at the
lower ranks*

There were a few C3P officers convicted of

inefficiency in office but at the completion ©f the screen
ing of committees* the CSP was still ia an influential
1The lew fork Times, July #* 1959* p» 9*

position«.
The actions taken against m m f of the public ser
vants was significant la view of the fact that prior to tfe®
Ayub Khan regime tbs tenure of the higher civil servants
m s protected by constitutional guarantees*

these consti

tutional provisions were- removed fey a presidential order
in March 1959* the actions taken against civil servants
m m m i ® by military encouragement*

Although there had

been m m % talk of corruption and inefficiency prior to the
195# revolution, the civil servants acting alone had never
tried to cleanse their own ranks*
At first the CSP rejected the military regime* bub*
on further consideration and realising that they could best
protect their positions* the CSP accepted a partnership with
the military*11 Furthermore* once the alliance m s formed,
the administrative officer® were then In a stronger position
to carry out their InstructIons without political interfer
ence*

Sow it was possible to proceed with economic planning

without the interruptions of the political elements in the
society*

Today, there can he no question that the Involu

tion has asserted a tighter control and more efficient
operation of government activities than any of its prede
cessors*

The more efficient and effective operation of

*Albert Corvine, MThe Civil Service Under the
Revolutionary Government in Pakistan,w Middle Rest Journal

(aunwr* 1*5)f p* 3*t*

tfc
government resulted from this eontr#1«

In these aspects of

the revolution’s activities the Civil Service has been cru
cial*

the skills and capacities of the CSF were indiapea-

sable to the fulfillment of the administration’s progress*1
Previous to the military take-over, the Civil Ser
vice had been frustrated In its ability to perform its
duties*

Incompetent and irresponsible politicians had.crea

ted a situation where it was almost impossible for the Civil
Service to obtain finances with which to discharge its
duties*

the enactment of Martial law enabled the Civil Ser

vice to execute what measures they considered expedient,®
and above all® free of politicians * interference^
The introduction of Sasic Democracies further
broadened: the influence and power of the Civil Service*

1b®

structure of Sasic Democracies is so constructed that the
administrative officers are able to overrule the decisions
of the elected officials at the lower tier levels*

Further

more , a close Inspection of the whole Stole Democracies
scheme reveals the degree of power and influence the Civil
Service has in the decision .making process of Pakistan*

At

the lower levels of the pyraaid structure of Basic Democra
cies the

majority of the members are sleeted officials*

1Sisir I* Gupta, gg* pit* * p« 53*
*Ayub Khan, M » ¥ , » M .

Sa2SSE*« gg* oit-« p« 73*
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However, near the top of the structure all positions of
Importance are held by appointed members of the Civil and
Military Serviced
The boat indication as to'whether or not there will
be a major change in Pakistan, is to be found In the
massive expansion of the CSP, This highly qualified
generalist servlet is the only service which can undertake the leadership required in a massive economic
development program* To date, the opposition to such
expansion ha# been so .great that it has even questioned
the intellectual capacity of the young m m of Pakistan,
Innumerable statement# have been made by CSP men that
Pakistan doe# not produce more than 25 qualified men,a
year for admission into, the CSP*
* * * In vmmaatft the functioning of the Pakistan Civil
Service in the revolutionary government provides an
interesting case study of the role of a tradition-bound
bureaucracy in a new country* In its struggles to main
tain It# privilege# and Its relationship with the mili
tary* it has seriously threatened to impair the momentum
©f the Revolution* Initially frightened and perhaps
still somewhat concerned about the military1# power ,
the CSP has been able to survive during the years of
recent turmoil by adjusting to the marginal demands
and administration innovations of the Revolution, Its
success ha# largely been determined by the essentially
non-revolutionary nature of Ayub Khan5# seimir# of
■power* Had Ayub Khan acted with the bold and radical
determination that. Americans have now m m - to associate
with revolutions, the CSP could never have survived* As
an entrenched bureaucracy with an orderly but traditionbound mode of work* it would have been the first target
of a genuine revolutionary Impulse* That It did survive
and successfully retain its privileged status is a
reflection upon Ayah Shan*# ideology of power and', also
upon his acceptance of the CSP as a necessary though
inhibiting instrument of government**
The dependence of President Ayub Khan upon the
cooperation of civil and military services has limited the
*Corvine, M * &}&•* pp* 135-36*

m
bypm aad auabers of programs he can .initiate*

Though he

ha# spoken out against the effects of pressure groups* he

still has found it wise to listen to their demands*
My own analysis has led «e to the conclusion that
Pakistan needed a strong government capable of making
decisions which might not be popular but which are
necessary for the' safety, integrity and, in particular,
development of the country* lie could not afford the
luxury of a system which would make the existence of
the government subservient to the whims and operations
of pressure groups* On this 1 was not prepare# to sake
any compromise*1
However, Khan has found It expedient to compromise.*

land-

reforms were on* of bh® first major programs which Khan
wished to commence*

However * as a .great portion of the

major officers is the military were either large landowners
themselves or were related by birth or marriage to land
owning families, they balked at any program which would
deprive them of holdings*®

furthermore, Khan has been

restricted in his desire to cut the military budget* 'the
military have argued that with India representing © hostile
neighbor, any reductions in the defense budget would b®
interpreted as a sign of weakness or concession*
The Civil Service on the other hand has resisted.
attempts by Khan to initiate legislation, which would punish
individuals who have practiced corruption*

One of the most

repeated criticisms of the Khan government has been that of
11£&SL>. P. *13.
2Qupta, j&* tip** p* 51*

a*
the economic rewards which have come about ©lac# the 1957
coup*

little of It baa found Its way to those who- needed

it most#

The principal beneficiaries hare either bee® or

are members of the bureaucracy# *
The President »a Position with the Military
and Mvil Service
Adoption of the 1962 constitution did not alter the
realities of political power*

As was the case with previous

Pakistan governments p the president was still obligated to
recognise one important reality5 he had to retain the coopera*
tioa and support of military and civil services to assure
his political solvency*^

Kfcaa had been able to establish

strong support within the army during, his tenure as Gamma*
d®r«in~Chief of the Armed Services#

the support had evolved

as a result of Khan*© programs to restore morale and effi*
ciency in. the military following the Rawalpindi Conspiracy
in 1951*

A group of politicians with the .aid of some Junior

officers in the Amy were plotting to seise power of the
Army, then eventually the country*

Before the conspiracy

could, materialise it was discovered and the conspirators
1The Times /hQn&QpJ* Feb0 Z$9 1964 * p» 6«
2Khalid B« Sayeed* 11The Capabilities of Pakistan’s
Political System#” Asia .purvey {February*: 196?)* p.* 100*

at

m m

arrested and eventually Jailed*

However, the Army

still received a "black-eye” from the incident and a lee®
of confidence « m g the civilian population.

It became the

undertaking of than to re-eetabiish this confidence and
rebelId the morale of the Army*

Before the 19$B coup Khan

.had been successful in his venture and as a result gained
the appreciation and loyalty of the major officer® in the
services*

CHAPTER VI

t m iMnm^sm
To m m m the role of the interest groups In Pakis
tan it will be necessary to- discuss the influence which
these groups exert upon the government end to review the
means by which their demands are introduced to the ruling
bodies,

t& assess political communication Ssi Pakistan it
would be advantageous to include a short discussion on the
status of communications in a transitional society#

*Thn

outputs of messages fro* the authoritative government struc
tures in a transitional society#w states Almond, #tends to
be far larger than the input sassages from the society
What are some of the elements in this fora of society which
could create this imbalance in input or wfeed-back* to
government officials or persons occupying influential posi
tions? One element comes immediately to mind # the tech
nological level of achievement could create such an imbal
ance#

let * the success of ’’feed-back*’ is not determined by

the level of technological advance but rather by the
iAlmond and Coleman, o£# .cffc#* p# 51#
90
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sensitivity which each group has to the reactions of smother
group,1 the transitional„ authoritative society Is able to
transmit its output® through various media to the rural
areas, but it is quit* reasonable 'to argue that the Inhabit
teats of these region® do not comprehend the meaning of
the message 02 Under these elrewwtantsa» the input fro®
the rural area® i® reduced enormously -and therefore each
group remains insensitive to each other#
Among the journalists, radio and television comment*
tutors in a modern society there is on established standard

of excellences
by which they can judge each other’s performance*
there may be such confusion and lack of precision
in this concept of profession, but there is on# cen
tral assumption upon which the entire modern commu
nications industry is built* this is the assumption
that the objective and unbiased reporting of event#
is possible and that the sphere of .politics can beet
be observed from, a neutral or non-partisan perspee*
tiv#*S
the media in transitional societies do not adhere to this
assumption*

lather, individuals involved in the receiving

and sending of messages interpret the communications and.
present their ® m prejudiced view,*

The citlsenry and the

1Py©„ QQo eito« p# 15% A i m see, Amltai Itsicni,
Pj>liMcal UniftoMon iriew forks Molt, Hinehart, and Win
stonInc,, 1W5)» p* 74*
2Almond and Coleman* gjg« cit», p* §2#
% e , OB* $!&** P* f6|#
*Ibld. it p# 164*
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which inhibits the press from being a *watch-dogn of govern*
merit* The ordinance gave the government sweeping powers
with which to suppress and penalise newspapers which were
ultra-critical of the Ilian administration*

Offensive pufelt*

cations coaid he seised by the government in their entirety
if editorials ©r subject matter in the papers were judged
to be offensive to the government or its personnel#. There**
for©# the ordinance has had the effect of muscling the press#
Furthermore, the government has utilised other means In
influencing the subject matter of the press*
« » » the Government has mad# a© secret of its use
of Its advertising as reward or denial, coercion to
its newspapers*
The result is that the English language daily
press is eealously conformist* Some Urdu and Ben
gali newspapers still venture to criticise, but are
promptly made to suffer for It#**
Through its control of the press, the government has tried
to create a favorable image of the president as a man who
is constantly concerned with the economic and political
development of the country#
Output from the government is also achieved fey the.
utilisation of the Civil Service*
Sim m the government party is not functioning
efficiently, the government has had to rely m the
bureaucratic machinery to publicise its development
program* In 1#? the existing bureaucratic machinery

1rXhe Times /Tendon?, February 25, 1#4, p. d*

%

was augmented by the creation of a West Pakistan
Information Service*1
The Pakistan government baa a virtual monopoly of
radio and television*

However* the influence of television

prior to 1967 is doubtful*

It is only within the last year

that a television _station was established in Pakistan#

In

contrast* the government has utilised radio in presenting
its politics to the citissenry*

It has been claimed by the

government that almost ninety-five per cent of the popula
tion in last Pakistan can be reached by radio-*

la West

Pakistan the figure has beta given at sixty per cent#®
The restrictive policies on inputs which the govern**
meat has practice# has been generate# by the desire to
effectively control or change a 9hostile political environ**
sent#.® The administration has begun to question its
repressive controls as factors which m f extend its re
sources an# creating further hostilities in the society*
Thus* Governor Slones Khan of Bast Pakistan admitted
that nif a Government machinery was to constantly
engage itself in the maintenance of law an# order it
was impossible for %h m to do m y sort of planning an#
carry on development work*®
1Khali# i* Sayeei* ^'Pakistan* Mew Challenges to
the Political System*® Apian Survey {February» 196§)* p« 102#
President Khan has been unable to inject sufficient
enthusiasm and organisation ability into his party to enable
it to launch a mass contact an# education program with the
people*
2XbicL * p. 102*
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* * , Similarly, party officials fa&v© been repeatedly
told to m u m the people that the opposition is deter
mined to mislead them by emotional slogans and ap
pealsJ
There is a certain degree of "feed-back''* to the
govemaeat*

la most eases it comes fro© the opposition

parties in the Assemblies*

However , it is doubtful if the

"feed-back" has any influence upon government policy*
It is obvious in the m m both of the Assemblies
and of the g m m t m m t political party that the .govern
ment is not yet capable ©f responding m as to accommo
date the demands that the political groups have been,
making* The government probably feels that most of
these demands are irreconcilable with Its own objec
tives.2
the domination which the government of Pakistan
exercises over the channels of communication and m m media,
and the reluctance of the government to respond to the
demands of other vested interests in the country has re
stricted the development of interest articulation*
articulation Is defined by Almond as?
for political action**^

Interest

^claims, demands

The danger of continuing to follow

such a policy is that it perpetuates the concept that
violence is the only means of achieving political access
to the ruling elite*
However, even when used deliberately, violence
always has the possibility of passing beyond the control
1Ibid*. p* 101*
%Ihid». p* 101*
3Almond and Coleman, png* clt*, p* 33*
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of its promoters. It has serious liabilities as a for®
of access# not the least of which is real clanger to
life and property for' those who use it. Characteristic,
eally , violence has been employed by those group* in
the political system which feel they have the least to
lose fro® chaotic upheaval# and which face an enormous
gap between possessions and expectations. But due to
its obvious liabilities# the violence is usually less
frequent where other channels for articulation of de
mands are open to a wide range of groups in the soci
ety*1
And it also delays the democratic growth in a society*
* . * the fate of democracy in the new states can be
-inspired not just by appreciating the basic values of
a democratic society but also by understanding the
nature of polities as a process by which conflicting
interests can be brought out into the open and then
adjustments can toe male which will maximize the inter
ests of all parties, for this to take place there must
toe an open process toy which interests are articulated
.and aggregated into 'public policies,*

iBUUml Ad&a&aftteB
The growth of articulation or articulation access
to- policy makers does not necessarily guarantee that the
Interest groups will have any influence upon political
decisions*

The deciding factor rests upon the acceptance

of the ruling group or individual on the wlegitimacy of the
claim, or a general attitude regarding group participation**^
Four main types of structures may be involved in
interest articulation: (1) institutional interest
1Gabriel A, Almond and 0* Bingham Powell# on, cit.n
p, 62*
2Pye* ££* Git., p* 61*
3Almond and Powell# o£» -olto** p* fit*
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groups , 12} non-aasoelationai interest groups , (3)
anomie interest groups* and |4) associations! interest
groupso*
Institutional interest groups are defined as being organi
sations snob ass

legislatures* political parties* politi

cal executives * armies * bureaucracies * and charehe®*
These are organisations which parfovn other social
or political functions but which are corporate bodies
or through groups within them * * * m y articulate their
own interests or represent the interests of groups in
the society#*
Ion«associatlonal interest groups include kinship and lineage
groups* ethnic* regional* religious* status and class group®
in which .articulation is transmitted through the leader®
of the groups*

Anomic interest groups are unconsctralned

movements in which articulation is expressed by riots and
demonstrations * Associations! interest groups represent
the special interest group® such ast

trade union®* busi

ness and ethnic organisation#^^
Of the institutional Interest groups in Pakistan,
only the army and bureaucracy have been effective in having
their demands receive political action*

the lack of

response by the ruling elites towards the demands of the
other group® has created m uneasy political climate*
fAlmond and Coleman,

2Ibid*, po 33 *
$ M & * » PP* 33-34®

g&<> elt*«

p* 33*

9*

During 196?, several major political groups were hostile
to the government*
three sectors?

Generally, "the protests emanated from

the political (in the form of meetings and

processions), the industrial (strikes), and the traditional
{sectarian riots k n* Iwenbwally the situation deteriorated
to where there was a threat to law and order m i the governmeat found it necessary to rely upon regulative and coercive
capabilities to control the hostile .political environment*
the two mechanisms it usually employed to control
the hostile environment were Section 144 of the Crim
inal Procedure Code and the Defense of Pakistan tales
framed under the- Defense of Pakistan Ordinance 1965
during the short war with India* Glider Section 144,
the government imposed restrictions on the holding of
meetings or processions s and on carrying firearm® and
other weapons for periods of up to two months* Under
the Defense of Pakistan tales, Rule 32 was used to de
tain persons who were deemed, likely through their'
activities to threaten the security of the country,
and Rule 47 to detain those who committed *prejudicial
acts*1 (speeches or publications, etc,)*
During 196?-, Section 144 was invoked almost every
.month in one district or another,^
Even the national or Provincial Assemblies have not been
taken into the confidence of the government in either the
formation or discussion of government policies,!
Eecognising how entrenched the present government
1Khalil S* Sayeed, MPakistan? H m Challenges to the
Political System sw Asian Survey* 711, Ko«< t (Feb,, 1961), 100,
%EMd, & p, 100,
3Ibid,, p. 9f,

m
was, five opposition partita {the Awml I.©ague, the Jamaat1-Islami, the Ifizasi-i-Iaiam forty § the National Beneerati#
Front, and the Council Muslim league) formed a united front,
the Pakistan Democratic Movement, in May 1967*

A platform

was adopted under which all the parties agreed to campaign
for the return of a parliamentary for® of government and a
legislature to he elected on the 'basis of adult franchisee
The result of the unification Is Inconclusive at the moment
to give m definite evaluation«*
JESUUsa* - M M M
Initially there was a ban on political parties*
Following the 195® coup all political parties and groups
were outlawed and Khan hoped, that this situation could be
perpetuated*

Howeverf Khan altered his position and opinion

of the role and usefulness of political partiest
1 mast confess he one wigcaleulatioti in respect
to the Constitution* having suffered through the serfid;
of the so-called political parties, I was hoping that
we would be able to run our politics without the party
system* Therefore the Constitution was so framed that,
in theory, it would function with or without political
rbiee* After the introduction of the Constitution,
soon came to realise that on© could not do without
political parties* Within the legislature the members
could only he organised on the basis of party rule and
discipline* Outside, there had to be an organisation
to maintain contact with the .people* There w m also a
meed to explain government policies to the people in

f

hbld., p, 97,

100

the country#14#; this could only fee dose by a politico!
party* 3© I came to the conclusion that under our con
ditions on® could sot really work the system without
politics! parti#***
Jyub Khan is himself a member of the Muslim League,
the party which was Identified with the independence move
ment of the f91G«4Qa0 To Khan# the League represents the
only .national political party in. Pakistan, drawing. Its sup
port from both province***

Whereas Khan states that «th#

ideology of most of our opposition parties Is based on
acute provincialism, religious exploitation, and extra
territorial loyalty#*5 he hat continually considered these
characteristics, in addition to the actions of the opposi
tion in the legislatures when making, appointments to- fill
a cabinet post in his government*

Khan5® reaction to

opposing political parties cam be noted in the statement
•the opposition has been behaving in a way which has forced

m® to rely entirely on my own party*^

However, Khan has

registered his disappointment with the Muslim League*. When
political parties were allowed to reform, Xhaa became a
member of the League because he believed it was the only
*Aynb Khan, friends lot Masters* m * clt«, p« 221«
2For an opposing view, see Kfeslid B» Sayeed, "The
Capabilities of Pakistanis Political System," Islam Survey
(February, 196?), p* 109#
llyub Khan, .FgM^S S B I M E S S » SSL* £&«» P* 222 >
Hbid »« p, 222*
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party which had a national appeal and did not base itself
on "acute provincialism, religious exploitation, .-and extra*
territorial loyalty,"*

However, there has been a continual

development of cliques within the party*

It has been re*

ported that elections held within the party ranks of the
league have often resulted either in iatra~party strife or
aroused no enthusiasm at all, with business or tribal leaders
being elected without any opposition*

The lack of response

has also extended itself into the political involvement
which party members have pursued*

President Khan has urged

the party workers of -the league to visit Union Councils,
hold.public meetings, discuss local problems with the people
and bring their grievances to the notice of the government
for action*

however, since neither the assemblies nor the

.party ©embers are requested to discuss the formulation of
political policies, the members of the league have become
.indifferent to the requests which the administration has
made m them*2
Landlords
Of the interest groups, the landlords have expert*
m m d the greatest Influence upon governmental policies*.
1S&ymd, "Pakistani
System," og* cltB„ p* 90*
*Xbi<U. p* 101*

lew Challenges to'the Political

Prior to 195f* the landlords exercised
life and death
tilled

virtually

over the large masher of tenant

their holdings*

a power of

farmers who

It was not surprising that these
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prevalent in Pakistani politics*

There are several politi

cal parties that are based upon religious ideology*
best example Is the Jamat-l-Xslaml

the

The lusli® league 9

the party of independence» m s treated to farther Islam*
If the Mullah do have any political influence s it lies la
the fact of their association with the mosque*

Muslims

pray five times a day and in doing so it affords the oppor
tunity of individuals cosing together to discuss religious#
political# and economic matters*

In this manner the mosque

represents a channel of mass communication*2
Students
The bsst'example of anomie interest since 195# is
the student organisations*

1st® in 1964 riots broke out in

Karachi when students picketed the state university*

the

students were demanding a series of reforms In the existing
educational system*

The demands ranged, from a fifty per

cent reduction Is fees to the 'nationalisation of missionary
educational institutions*

In October of the same year# the

student leaders presented their demands to the government*
When a period of two months had elapsed and the government
had failed to take any action, the students picketed*
Police were dispatched to the university to break up the
*Almond and Coleman,

tit** p* 19#*

20houdhry and Khan, £g* elt*, p* 95»
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lb la obvious that Ayub cannot merely rely on his
traditional sources of strength— the civil service and
the army* He needs a well organised political party
with an imaginative program which has appeal to all
sections of the country, With an organised and popular
political party* curbs on political activity may become
unnecessary. Opposition parties faced with a well knit
government political'party tend to tone down their
extreme demands and try to reach a common measure of
agreement with other parties to f e w a united opposi
tion, All governments in Pakistan have tried to keep
the country united through institutions like the army
and the bureaucracy, hut no government so far has tried
to build unity of lasting and durable mature which rests
on political foundations**
the Feasants
Of the interest groups in Pakistan, the 'peasant M s
the least experience in politics*

Isolated .from the large

centers of political activity, exploited, illiterate, and
often incapable of comprehending the complexities.of a
modern world s the peasant has often been overlooked or
disregarded by the political leaders of Pakistan,

The

characteristics used to describe this section of the popu~
lotion are similar to those used to describe m peasant In
an agrarian society**-®, society in which the bulk of the
population is engaged in the occupation of subsistence
agriculture*

Pakistan is m agrarian society,

* , , a peasant in s wholly agrarian society, is
generally poor and always Ignorant— bv the standards
not only of industrialised, societies but also by his
ora aristocracy. He is poor because of his primitive
technology, because of population pressure, and because

pystea,

gg,

"Th® Capabilities of Pakistan", Political
p* W *

m
the aristocracy m y take from him whatever he proiuces
in m m m of his .most basic needs. this often means
that chronic malnutrition and disc®#© or® the fats of
a large part of the peasantry* What statistics we hare
on per capita, income and: consumption9 average dietary
level# infant mortality rates# and average life expect
tancy in agrarian societies all document a material of
life almost incredibly low by the standards of advanced
societies*
Even where he is well-fed , however# the peasant Is
ignorant.* lie is tied to the soil by necessities of his
work# if not by law, and mobility beyond a very small
radius seems to him neither possible nor desirable*
Engaged in a subsistence economy, he is dependent on
neither imports or exports from, his small village
community* In such a society# communications between
the village and the outside world m m extremely limited#
and so# therefore# are the peasants* knowledge of that
world and his intellectual horiaom * * * Ignorance and
isolation# however, are characteristics common to the
bulk of the population, in #11 traditional agrarian
societies* So great are they that th# peasants in on©
village cannot even .know that there are .peasants in
other villages like theirs# much less that they consti
tute the great majority of the population of wtheir
country” of whose w d v t w w they may not ■b& aware
either*^
In test 'Pakistan the peasant has not constituted a
significant political force because of the power which the
landlords previously exercised over them*

the. absence of

a landlord elite in politically conscious Bast .Pakistan has
enabled the .peasant, t# become more politically independent *
nevertheless # the last Pakistani peasant still had diffi
culty in responding to politics that were not identified
with his village or town*2

fftMttoky, ga* £&&»*

PP*

2ldgar L* Owens# ”Democratic Development in last
Pakistan” (Washington, 6*0*, Embassy of Pakistan# 19641#
po 11*

m
The conception and adoption of Basle Seaocra©!®.#
was an attempt to involve this group of the population into
becoming m

active and knowledgeable participant in the

domestic affairs of their community and eventually of the
higher level# of governments
ha# been defined

the policy of Basic Democracy

«*t

An attempt to revolutionize not only the tenure
system or rural Pakistan hut the transitional political
structure which enfranchise# landlord# and headmen* to
the detriment of both modernisation and peasant wel*
fare**
there .have also been extensive efforts by the govern*
aunt to indue® change la the social and technological ©us*
toms of the rural are##* Government programs have Improved
communication and transportation facilities and therefore
have afforded the rural families the opportunity be seek
employment outside of the rural community*

Farmer# have

begun, bo accept and utilise new agriculture' techniques,
while th# introduction of electricity has brought about a
change in the recreational activities of the rural families*
There have ale© been changes in the social, customs*

Rural

families are becoming lee# authoritarian and more democratic
a# the role of women ha# been broadened*

In If59# Family

laws were introduced which guaranteed women more of an oppor*
tunity to obtain an. education*

Also included la the law

% * A, Wilcox# Pakistani Consolidation jg* a flatten
(lew forks Columbia University Press# 19&3J# p« 209*

10*
was the abolishment of parentally arranged marriages*

Iw*

ewer, the speed of change has been sluggish in respect to
the other institutions*1
The concentrated effort by the government to Stitt**
late development in the rural areas has frustrated other
groups in the society*

the urban educated classes have

complained that the Khan administration, has been too paternal
and that basic democracy has been designed for the limited
horizons of the uneducated*

nMo doubt,” state# an article

1® the flues*, the concern of the lhan government is wt©
give the peasants a better deal*”2

1Ch0udhry and Khan, og* alt* * pp« *6~**«
2fh.e .times fjondoj^, December ti, 1904, p* %

CHAPTER Y U

A CASE STUDY OP J&BCTIOKS IK A MILITARY
OLIGARCH!:

1960*1965

A great, deal of interest, was aroused, by the an
nouncement in March of 1962 that, the first election® to
the national and frovtacial Assemblies under the new eon**
stitution would be held during April and !%y with the
go,000 Basie Beaeerats elected in 1960 serving as an .Elec
toral College for this purpose*
flie national kmmhlf ©lection® case first*

Even

though political parties were banned* a large number of
those elected were formerly prominent in politics, many of
them active in the old Muslim league*

In the ©lections for

the two provincial assemblies» however, former politician.®
were not so successful*

Meanwhile, the president issued

another order reinforcing his ban m political organisa
tions of any kind pending action on the matter fey the new
Motional Assembly*
In. spite of the president’s plea to the members of
the.new assemblies to forsake partisan politic® and to give
the new constitution a fair trial, many refused to cooper
ate*

they first took aim at the restriction on political
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organizations*

After nearly six weeks of controversy, the

president signed a bill permitting political parties, al
though he refused to go along with a plm that M s Elective
Bodies (Disqualifleation) Order he rescinded*1 Bo also
signed a M i l amending the Freve&tatlve Dewteatien Laws m
that a person could not he detained longer than three months
without the unanimous approval of a two-man board consist
ing of a Supreme Court Judge and a senior government offi
cial nominated by the president*2

During, a heated debate

in the Bast Pakistan Assembly the Finance Minister noted
that fewer persons had been held under preventative deten
tion by the Khan government than under previous regimes#
Under the Muslim League government* he pointed out*: ** .many
as 1,3id persons had been detained; the United Front gov*
©rniaenfc had held 32? personsf under martial law 305 indi
viduals had been held, of whom only 111 were still detained
(1963).3

With the return to politics, the government found
itself' subjected to a barrage of criticism from a highly
vocal minority in the various assemblies#

the press seemed

1flume orders were designed to bar from public
office those politicians and civil servants convicted of
corrupt practices while In. public office#
^Qsednow, £g« oito, p# 266*
3Ibid*
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delighted to have this additional source of news and opin
ion, having been overly dependent m relatively bland handouts from government administrative sources,

The last

Pakistan newspaper demonstrated a strong anti-government
bias in their rendering of the news s with harsh anti*
government articles*

In duly

1962, the government black

listed throe dally newspapers in East Pakistanj this meant
that no government advertising was to be placed in them*
Even the pre-government newspaper* Pakistan limes
(Lahore) provided a sounding board' for anti-government
charges*

In one instance it printed a claim by a member

of the National Assembly that the sons of the Aray generals
were resigning from the Army to Join industry and that they
had found this to be financially rewarding,

the article

constituted a full-blooded attack on the alleged tendency
of influential government officials to get their sons and
nephews into lucrative lobs with commercial firmsJ
the political development following the adoption
of the Constitution was. a period of disappointment for
Ayub Ibea*

first ruling under Martial Law and then under

the provisions of the authoritarian constitution* Shan
had been able to initially resist pressures from political
groups who wanted to have parties reestablished*

Prior

to the presidential election of I960* all political activity
^Ayhto Khan, Friends lot Masters, op* pit*. p. 222*.
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had been banned*

However, for the election all martial law

regulations which prohibited the organisation, convening or
attending of any political meetings were relaxed#

Eventually

Khan, moderated bin opinion of political parties and signed a
bill which .again allowed for their formation#
The sane old politicians he had denounced on so many
occasions cm© to the fore on©# more*’* those who had not
been barred fro® political activity participated openly,
.many of the® winning assembly seats# Other .politicians
operated behind the scenes#

Meat organised political actio

vlty seemed to be directed against the constitutional inno
vations of the president#2
Ayub Khan viewed with obvious displeasure the
behind-the-scenes political efforts of those he thought he
had effectively barred fro® politics#
he imposed new political restrictions#

On January ?> 1963,
The Political Par

ties Act was amended to redefine political parties in the
broadest .possible terns as "a group or combination of per
sons operating for the purpose of propagating any political
opinion or indulging in any other political activity* ** A
further amendment prohibited disqualified individuals from
associating thesselves with a political party, and the
central government was authorised to direct any such person
*Ibid.» p* 221#
albid#. p. 2|2*

to refrain irom m f press statements for a perled of si*
months*^

Through these measures the president seemed deter®*

mined to stop any political activity whatsoever on the part
of the politicians previously disqualified under less strin
gent provisions*.
In short# Ay»b Khan exercised a fim control over the
government, The vocal politicians could talk and make head
lines# hut they had very little power*

Her was there any

likelihood that the president would give politics a free
rein# because the emerging, political leadership consisted
of the old .politicians long sine® discredited in his eyes#
lot until 19^5 was there any real test of the acceptability
of Khan*a .methods*

At this time a hew Electoral College

was chosen through elections*

Potentially# under the terns

of the Constitution# the Basic Democrats could elect a. new
president and thus destroy the political system which Khan
.had Imposed upon Pakistan*
The schedule 1965 elections brought forth an in
crease in the activity among the opposition parties*

Early

in 1965 they began to search for a presidential candidate
who would represent them*

Eventually in September 1964 Mies

Fatima Jinnsh, sister to All Jlnnah, was nominated, to repre
sent the Combined opposition Parties la the forthcoming
elections*
1Richard Wheeler# *Pakistan! Mew Constitution# Old
Issues*1* Asian Survey (February, 1963),# p* 100*

m
The Combined Opposition consisted of five partita:
the Councillors* Muslim League, which claims to be the
true inheritor of the 014 Mhmlitt League (the President's
party also claims the same name.); the Awaal CPeople4s
League , « » ©sseatiaHy an last Pakistan Party; the
National $mmi Party, a splinter of the Awami League,
which adds support in the old Horth West Frontier region
«- # * to its roots in last Pakistan; the Mizam-i-Isla®,
a religiously based party with modernising intentional
and the Jsmaat-i-Xslami, the party of out-and-out
orthodoxy0
« . • Apart from Miss Jinnah, the Opposition parties
hay# a common nine-point platform, but in fact this is
more a statement of th# lowest common denominator of
unity than a programme* Their real unity is negative,
disapproval of President Ayub and the rejection of the
polity he has established— one of whose main purpose is
precisely to keep them out of power and to keep the
executive free from their obstructIon*1
During the initial stages of the campaign Khan did
not Journey about Pakistan in an attempt to gain support for
his policies*

However, as the attacks of the opposition and.

Miss Jinnah intensified he began to travel about the country
in search of support#
So far as political organisation is concerned,
President Ayub is at a disadvantage# The five opposi
tion parties which have rallied behind Mist Jinnah may
be disparate and indeed irreconcilable when it comes to
evolving a common programme, but they are as one for the
immediate cause of unseating: President Ayub and des
troying the system he has established#
The President, on the other hand, has not used him
five year® in power to create a political following for
himself and has to rely on on# of the two factions of
the old Muslim League, a weak reed, especially in East
Pakistan**
1The Times /Tondon7» October 12, 1964, p« t*
2Ibid#, December 30, 1964*
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For fcfals election every adult somber of the society
would cast his vote in favor of the candidate he wished to
fee a Basic Democrat.

As outlined in the Electoral Act of

1964t the % m provinces were divided into 40,000 basic unit®,
each unit electing a Basic Democrat„* the Basic democrats
would then form the Electoral College that would elect the
President and the National and Provincial Assemblies*

The

elections for the Sasic Democrats was held in November*
The completed elections for the Sasic Democrats did
not end the campaign for the office of President,*

Both

candidates continued to seek support for their platform but
now from the Basic Democrats*

finally on January 2* i$$$

the Basic Democrats voted for their choice of President*
The tabulated votes gave Khan 63 per cent of the votes cast#
while Miss' Jinnah obtained 39 per cent*

The suspected

claims fey the opposition that the elections were manipulated
fey Khan’s supporter® were not substantiated to any extent.
Prior to the election# Khan had announced that he would
not tolerate any interference or participation in the
"political fray" fey government officials*3
These elections did not increase Khan1® fondness for
*Xn December of 196? the Electoral College of
i0#000 Basic Democrats was increased to 120*000 for the
next national election* Similarly# each Assembly {National
and two Provincial) was to have 208 members* as increase of
slightly over 50 members each*
2Th& Times VTondonT,, December 30* 1964.

p®libieml process*

X© him, polities * besides being distaste

ful, is a, highly distracting activity which developing
countries can ill afford*

Elian hopes that through the

system of.-Basle Democracies, political authority and power
will flow in a simple fashion to the top of the pyramid,
namely, the president*

he had been under the impression

that politicians arid political parties could be d*~l«g«llsed
out of existence by having' them, branded as corrupt and
irresponsible*

However, soon .after the establishment of a

new Constitution in 1962 and particularly after the Presi
dential and Assembly elections in 1965,. politicians have
been able to mobilise support among the non-ruling elite
groups*

Furthermore, through the support of the army and

the powers that he enjoys under the new Constitution, Khan
has been able to k m p the politicians, even after the lift
ing of H&rtial law, in a state of suspended animation* *

1Khalid Bo Sayeed, *1965— an Epoch-Making Tear is
Pakistan— General Elections and War with India,w Aslan
iHSXig, n» !©# 2 {February, 1966), 76-B5*

COHCLUSZOB

Pakistan still represents the modernising oligarchy
described by ShiIs,

This does not tender the opinion that

fro® 1955 to date political development in Pakistan has
regained dormant*,

Quite the contrary, changes were thrust

upon the society.

However, the broad spectrum of reforms

introduced by the military and bureaucratic cliques did not
necessarily mean a movement towards democrat!satlon,

The

introduction of Sasic Democracies and its system, was an
attempt to Involve the rural population in the responsi
bilities of modern politics and government« Also* is 1962
a constitution was promulgated*

However« the influence of

the Sasic-Democrats upon the cliques was non-existent be
cause of the bureaucratic domination of the decision-making
process*

the constitution was authoritarian in that it

gives almost despotic powers to the president*
Under the tutelage of the administration, legisla
tive bodies were created, but neither the president nor
his cabinet informed or consulted with the assemblies on
the political and economic policies of the government*
Democrat!z©tion was further thwarted in the attitude which
m

ltd

the government retained towards their opposition#

Politi

cal parties have been permitted to develop, but the contin
ued distrust which the government holds towards these groups
and the 1aek of response which the administration has shown
to the demands of the opposition groups has not altered the
political make-up of the modernising oligarchy*

newspapers

continue to he censored or confiscated if adverse materials
appear in their publications#

Economically * Pakistan has

experienced a respectable rate of growth and has not suf
fered the mass starvation which India has felt the last
few years,1 However, regardless of these development**
democratic institutions have not been allowed, to grow#

Hot

until newspapers are allowed their freedom and political
groups, whether they be of the opposition or the government
party, are granted a voice in the decision-making process
will democratic government b© realised.,
Pakistan faces a serious dilemma,

A competent,

modern, well-organised bureaucracy is required If public
order is to be maintained and development goals realised,
However, such a bureaucracy has a strong, tendency to
monopolise all decision making of consequence and to prevent
the growth of institutions which sight ultimately compete
with it,

iithout other modem institutions capable of

harnessing and controlling such a bureaucracy, the prospects
of democracy are dim.

is,,si®, saggatag, si, sis*, v- ’*•
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If democracy is to be realised.* governmental jxmar
must be delegated to the institutions below the central
geirercneat*

Municipalities need the power to pans their own

Inwe, to enforce thee© laws* and to levy t& % m 9 all without
the interference from higher governmental level**

This mmf

be- granted as long as the municipalities adhere to their own
functions# do not deny the rights of the minorities# and
respect the constitution*.
Turning to the military services* certain policy
changes are desirable if the ultimate dictatorship of the
military bureaucracy is to be avoided*

The army sice must

be reduced to minimise the possibility of a military dietutorship arising*

Also* a reduction in the numerical sis®

of the professional military officers would eiislmte the
possibility of a dictatorship*
The widely held view that only a powerful govern
mental elite* unhampered by representative institutions*
can speed political development in the new states deserves
to be seriously challenged*

But even if this view were

sound# it fails to consider the Importance of democratic
institutions*

Is rapid economic growth worth it if the

price is a totalitarian state?

An uncontrolled bureaucracy,

far from being efficient# may develop a vested interest in
red tape# over-centralisation* and corruption*

A powerful

bureaucracy, anxlou* to perpetuate its rule may suppress

Institutions that are essential to economic growth, m well
m to democratic government*

This doe® not deny* however „

that a competent bureaucracy is one of many institutions
upon which effective democratic government m m t he based*.
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Aug* 194?

M* A, Jinnah

Sojsfe* 194i

Sept* 194#

Kfowa^Ia liactmuddin

Get* 1951

©et* 1951

Ghulaa Mohammad

Sept* 1955

Sept* 1955

Xakandar lltria,

Get. 1f5#

m*

Ayub Khan

I960

Prime Minlaker
Aug* 194?

Liaqu&t All Khan

Get* 1951

Get* 1951

Kbuatja Nasi&uddin

April 1953

Apr* 1953

Mohammad All

Aug* 1955

Aug* 1955

Chaudhri Mohammad All

Sftpt* 195#

Sept* 1956

H, S* Suhr&vr&rdy

Got* 195#

m
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U8tE OF GHKOIOLOOI
Creation of Pakistan
Hawalpindl Conspiracy
first Constitution Promulgated
Martial law Imposed

14 * &

47

5 * 51
23 * 3 e s#
? *10 0 5#

land Reform Cottnivsion Appointed

31 .10 # 5#

.land Reform Commission Report Submitted

20 * 1

Partial lifting of Martial law

59

6 *12 o 59

Election of Basic Democrats

25 .22 o 59

foie of Confidence for Ayub Sbaa

15 * 2 * 40-'

Constitution Commission Appointed

17 * 2

.40

Constitution Commission Bepert Submitted

6 * 5 # 61

Constitution Promulgated

1 » .3 o 62

Election of national Assembly Members

4 0 62

Election of Provincial Assembly numbers

5 0 62

11setoral College Act

17 . 4 -# 64

Presidential Elections

2 . 1 * 65
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